Escorting shadow fleet tankers with warships signals a direct challenge to Western enforcement of sanctions.

In a development that could mark a new phase in maritime tensions between Russia and the West, the Russian Navy has for the first time visibly escorted tankers from its so-called “shadow fleet” through the English Channel. The warship involved, Boikiy, a Steregushchiy-class corvette, accompanied two tankers, Selva and Sierra, en route to Baltic ports. Both vessels are believed to be operating in breach of Western oil sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The escort operation, which involved Russian falsification of ship location data and prompted a response from the Royal Navy, indicates a shift in the Kremlin’s approach to maritime sanctions evasion. The decision to deploy a modern warship in direct support of vessels engaged in circumventing international restrictions has raised concerns within NATO and among G7 member states.

Although the transit occurred in international waters, it is the strategic context that has drawn attention. Royal Navy surveillance confirmed that Boikiy was actively protecting the tankers while transmitting false Automated Identification System (AIS) data – a tactic that, while not illegal for warships, is considered professionally irregular during peacetime in such heavily monitored waterways.

The UK responded by dispatching HMS Somerset, a Type 23 frigate, to monitor and escort the Russian vessels through British territorial waters. The frigate’s presence served a threefold purpose: intelligence-gathering, deterrence, and readiness to respond to any escalation. According to defence analysts, the decision to deploy a frigate rather than a patrol vessel reflects the seriousness with which the UK interpreted the Russian move.

In terms of capability, the two vessels are relatively evenly matched. The Type 23 carries advanced surveillance assets, Naval Strike Missiles, and the Sea Ceptor missile defence system, recently tested in operational conditions in the Red Sea. The Russian Steregushchiy-class is similarly equipped with a mix of missiles, guns and helicopter support. While the likelihood of open conflict remains low, the proximity of armed ships in contested waters raises the risk of miscalculation.

The implications of this naval encounter go beyond the immediate incident. The shadow fleet, a dispersed group of ageing and often unregistered tankers, has become critical to Russia’s ability to sustain its energy exports in the face of Western sanctions. The escort operation suggests Moscow is no longer relying solely on legal ambiguity and maritime obscurity to keep this system functioning. It is now willing to use hard power in defence of its illicit economic lifelines.

Such an approach introduces new risks into European maritime security. Until now, enforcement of sanctions against the shadow fleet has been largely administrative and reliant on port state control measures. Naval enforcement has been limited by legal and practical constraints, particularly in international waters. However, the Russian use of military escorts effectively raises the stakes for any attempt at interdiction.

In recent months, Western intelligence agencies have also reported increased Russian naval and sub-sea activity across European maritime zones, including suspected interference with undersea infrastructure and hybrid surveillance operations. In one incident earlier this year, a NATO aircraft was intercepted by a Russian jet during a monitoring mission involving a suspected sanctions-evading tanker in the Baltic Sea.

The Channel transit should therefore be seen in the broader context of Russia’s increasingly assertive posture at sea. As pressure mounts on its economy and military forces, Moscow appears more willing to challenge Western norms and test the boundaries of acceptable maritime conduct. The move also suggests that Russian leadership perceives the shadow fleet’s continued operation as vital to national interests.

From a strategic perspective, the incident is a reminder that sea lanes and choke points are becoming politicised arenas once again. The English Channel joins a growing list of contested maritime spaces – alongside the Red Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Taiwan Strait – where economic interests, military assets and political signalling intersect.

The challenge now facing Western policymakers is whether and how to respond. Increased naval presence, legal clarification on interdiction rights, and enhanced tracking of the shadow fleet may form part of an emerging strategy. However, the presence of Russian naval assets alongside commercial vessels complicates any effort to intervene without risking escalation.

Ultimately, this episode reflects a growing willingness by Russia to use its navy not only to project power but to protect economic interests under pressure from international sanctions. By altering the rules of engagement at sea, Moscow has introduced a new variable into the already complex landscape of European maritime security. The West must now decide whether to adapt in response – and how far it is willing to go to challenge this latest act of defiance.