Security of Europe through Unity and Resolve

This material was written for the Polish outlet Eastern Flank Institute and was published on the think tank’s website on 20 October 2025.

The war in Ukraine is the result of a whole range of mistakes in foreign policy pursued since independence. From the early 1990s our leadership declared the so-called multi-vector policy, an intention to maintain good relations both with the West and with Russia, seeking to benefit from both directions.

Beyond the fact that such a policy led the country towards great trouble and long prevented resistance to external influence, it allowed us to receive economic benefits from Europe and the United States (through loans and investment), while enjoying preferential prices for Russian gas and access to Russian markets.

During this time, Russia systematically increased its influence inside the country by supporting loyal political parties and individual actors, applying economic pressure through energy carriers and investing in strategic enterprises, conducting propaganda in the media and backing the Russian-speaking environment.

Perhaps the most significant mistake, however, was the underestimation of Russia and the excessive trust placed in the security assurances contained in the Budapest Memorandum.

When war broke out in 2014, none of the major powers came to our aid, limiting themselves to sanctions against Russia. This shows that international agreements not backed by concrete security instruments are an empty space—into which, when seeking room for itself, war will inevitably come.

We recall Ukraine today precisely because of the situation our state has found itself in during the fourth year of a full-scale war such as humanity has not yet seen in the 21st century.

Whether all the above applies to anyone other than Ukraine I cannot assert. One thing is clear: Russia is militarising; its economy runs on a war footing, and its society is being saturated with propaganda. What it did among you, its neighbours, yesterday is worth verifying, and why it is doing this today must now be determined.

Moreover, today Russians see no reasons why they should stop. The war in the centre of Europe has not only affected every Ukrainian; to the rumble of a crumbling old world, it has become global and is about to knock on the neighbour’s door. The neighbour who lives with us on the same small floor called Europe. It is about Europe that we shall speak. About Europe as a neighbour in a global war.

In the fourth year of war it can be stated with confidence that the process which began in February 2022, like any great war, has led to the collapse of ideas and theories on which the very notion of world order was based.

All who thought they knew everything, or who considered “concern” a panacea, are deeply disappointed.

All who are involved in this war, even those observing it, have seen what they did not plan and did not expect.

Some, still now in the agony of disappointment in their own illusions, continue to assert that everything happening concerns only those illusions.

The truth, however, is that for some this is grief and pain, while for others it remains a dry chronicle. Yet it is certainly a vortex of events that will change the world forever.

What, then, is happening today in this vortex, which, by the tacit consent of the no-longer-existing old world, is gaining momentum?

On the night of 27–28 September 2025, 552 UAVs, at least two ballistic missiles and at least 31 cruise missiles were used against the territory of Ukraine. On the night of 6–7 September, the largest use of aerial attack assets was recorded—no fewer than 776 at once. Quite recently, around two dozen Russian drones entered Poland; three or four were shot down using extremely expensive missiles.

Within days, Russian aircraft calmly entered Estonian airspace. They were pursued by two of NATO’s most modern Italian F-35 fighters, scrambled from an airbase 50 kilometres from Tallinn.

Shortly afterwards, The Telegraph described NATO’s reaction in telling fashion.

“The Italians began the routine of an aerial intercept, rocking their wings from side to side. In reply, the Russians rocked theirs back. Then one of the pilots raised his hand and waved in a friendly manner. For the next 12 minutes, the Italian pilots trailed the Russians all the way to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad – an unprecedented length of time for an incursion into Nato airspace,” the article stated.

Thus, linking only these events from the vortex of total war, we draw a simple conclusion: while Europe decides whether its reaction was sufficiently resolute, the Russians launch the next thousands of drones, and Ukrainians, surviving on their own, continue to buy time for their neighbours. Time, above all, to rid themselves of illusions.

Again I repeat: four years of hostilities delineate revolutionary changes in the conduct of war. It is already possible to state with confidence that a new type of war has appeared and that the art of war will be radically altered for the entire twenty-first century.

One of the main features of such a war is that no country in the world is capable, on its own, of withstanding the modern intensity of combat and fully meeting the entire spectrum of defence needs.

Therefore, for us to survive, we must find answers to a number of questions in the context of the ongoing war. Above all, we must ensure the necessary guarantees of our own security in the future.

First. Is there today a real path for Ukraine to obtain the necessary level of cooperation with Europe in order to meet, as far as possible, the needs of today’s war?

In this survival programme we are concerned with:

• How realistic are expectations of receiving military assistance from Europe in the form of air defence systems and munitions.
• How realistic is access in the near term to financial resources to fund our own defence industry.
• How realistic is access to Europe’s exceptional scientific and manufacturing technologies, including satellite technologies.
• How feasible is it to organise our production quickly and scale it on European territory.

Second. By stepping up its own efforts to transform defence policy, is Europe truly seeking to build a new security architecture? Is there a place in it for Ukraine?

Here, drawing on our own experience, it is worth understanding:

• Is there political will to carry out fundamental changes to Europe’s security landscape.
• Are there signs of the formation of European Armed Forces as the basis for combat capabilities and future alliances.
• How realistic is the reform and consolidation of Europe’s defence industry.
• How realistic is the satisfaction of Ukraine’s urgent needs within the framework of Europe’s defence industrial reform.

Despite the multitude of discussions at various venues in both Ukraine and Europe, and the postponement of further sanctions packages, today there is a single programme document to have appeared in Europe.

This is the Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, prepared by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on 19 March 2025.

Evidently, this document is also a response to the work of a group of European experts led by Mario Draghi (former President of the European Central Bank), who in September 2024 prepared a comprehensive paper entitled “The Future of European Competitiveness”.

For the first time it concentrates emphasis on the need for Europe’s strategic autonomy amid growing competition, including with the United States.

Beyond identifying the problems facing the European Union, the Draghi report contains an action plan and proposes immediate implementation, with particular emphasis on coordination in Europe’s defence industry.

In this regard, the presentation by the Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, of the conceptual document Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 is, of course, a response to these problems.

Indeed, the White Paper identifies both the threats and challenges facing Europe now and likely to grow in future, and the ways to neutralise them through the development of the European security and defence sector.

This document, written under the pressure of war, should in principle persuade Europe that it is able to defend itself.

For the moment, however, this official material remains for us almost the only written pathway towards even a basic understanding of the shaping of Europe’s future security, which, clearly, is for now based on strengthening the European defence-industrial base.

The extremely difficult situation now prevailing in Ukraine, and our own experience, give me the right to consider Europe’s security from practical, including military, considerations.

The main aim, of course, is to establish whether Ukraine can, in a war of attrition, fully count on Europe—if not as an ally, then at least as a reliable partner.

Second, and no less important for us: to determine whether Europe understands the need to form a new security architecture on the European continent itself.

To this end I recall the words of a classic of military strategy. At the start of the twentieth century he wrote:

“In contemporary realities peace itself is first and foremost the result of violence and is maintained by violence. Every state border is the result of war; and the outlines of all states on the map acquaint us with the strategic and political thinking of the victors, while political geography and peace treaties are also a strategic lesson…”

Thus, taking into account the strategic lessons we in Ukraine have received today in waging war against the largest empire on the continent, I note that the very definition of security and its assured achievement rests on rather simple notions that do not change with time—and, crucially, have been tested by our war.

First—political will concerning readiness for practical, including unpopular, steps to ensure this security.
An example of such political will was Winston Churchill (1874–1965), the British politician and Prime Minister in 1940–45 and 1951–55, a key figure of the Second World War.

The obvious question today is: to what extent are the citizens of EU member states and their political elites prepared to prioritise defence if this were to mean, for example, a decline in economic wellbeing?

Second—well-trained armed forces equipped with modern weapons and operating under contemporary doctrines. These forces must also be formed into a clear hierarchical system based on a single command system and doctrine of employment.
Even in our conditions, where the centralised subordination of the defence forces is enshrined in law, there has not always been sufficient time for joint standardisation in armaments, training and employment.

Third—the defence-industrial complex. This is one of the important components that wholly determines the readiness of the armed forces to realise their potential in ensuring security.
Drawing on our experience, when speaking of the defence industry as a security component, we must understand that globally it will be defined by the following criteria:

1. Availability of raw materials, above all for the production of munitions. It is especially important to determine whether, today, there are sufficient components for producing powder as the basis of all explosive substances.
   It is known that nitrocellulose lies at the heart of its formula. It can be obtained from processing cellulose from industrial hemp, cotton and wood. Does this programme envisage increased cultivation of these crops, or will this be done in cooperation?
   And how will the issue be resolved with chips and microcircuits manufactured in entirely different global regions?

2. Availability of technologies and infrastructure (enterprises and transport) that can be expanded and reorganised to maximise production in the interests of defence.
   Such infrastructure must be unified politically, economically and by common standards and supply chains. Will this not harm, for example, national governments, which form their revenues and budgets on the basis of such national infrastructure?

3. A workforce sufficient in number and qualification to meet the needs of all branches of production. Sufficiency and qualification, especially in high-tech fields, will be decisive in implementing any production programmes and requests.

4. Once again, political will—when, through compulsion, propaganda and calls to civic duty, the civilian population is prompted not only towards certain restrictions but, in future, even to sacrifices, however intolerable.

Accordingly, this first systemic document must be viewed only from a strategic perspective, particularly with an eye not only to the present but to the necessity of long-term foresight.

The war in Ukraine, the reconsideration of the US role in ensuring European security, and the build-up of Russia’s armed forces beyond the bounds of today’s war should shape only a realistic vision of the future security architecture.

However, in studying this document, and considering both our and Europe’s perspective, we can state that to achieve its principal aim the declared allocation of money is absolutely insufficient. Europe, unfortunately, needs both political will and time.

Speaking specifically of political will as the main driver of such progress, it must be understood that success will depend today on the political will of all 27 different countries. Having travelled an extremely difficult path to membership, these states nevertheless have differing priorities, resources and perceptions of threat.

This is probably why the White Paper repeatedly stresses that defence remains the prerogative of individual states and a matter of unanimity, as provided for by the Treaty on European Union.

Whether this will slow or block key defence projects, we shall see. Yet achieving a centralised approach to forming security on this basis is certainly impossible.

As regards the production base, a wide field for work opens. It is worth noting that, according to the Draghi report, over 60% of defence procurement in Europe is made in the United States. That is the present state.
This state must be expanded, and Europe’s defence-industrial base—fragmented by country—will clearly require political will and time to scale.

On personnel, we must remember Europe’s well-developed labour law, which does not allow neglect of working-condition standards. Whether there are enough specialists today, and where their training will be organised, is hard to say.

We understand well who works in Europe’s factories today. It is already possible to forecast how this will affect the expansion of production capacities.

Speaking effectively of preparing for a “not-Second World War”, the White Paper also declares ambitions to lead in artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, hypersonics and robotics.

Yet in terms of investment, human resources and maturity, all these fields in Europe lag the United States and China by many years. Achieving such ambitious goals by 2030 is, evidently, unlikely.

Let us recall that the main reasons for creating the European Union were the pursuit of peace and stability, economic development through a single market, and the support of democracy and shared values. All this was accompanied by an absolute security guarantee from the United States and NATO.

It follows that the European Union itself currently lacks clear mechanisms of so-called compulsion. As a result, the foundations for implementing political will are absent.

Therefore, the implementation of the intentions declared in this document will proceed through “motivation” and “encouragement”, without the creation of binding mechanisms.

This naturally prompts large countries such as France, Germany and Italy to continue developing national projects. Other countries will remain outside such opportunities. How this will affect the declared capabilities of the remaining national armed forces of EU countries is, for now, unknown.

Considering the implementation of such a project, note also that, while keeping NATO as the security priority, the EU is already developing cooperation within Europe—for example, through the Kensington Treaty between the United Kingdom and Germany, the Aachen Treaty between Germany and France, and the updated Lancaster House Agreements between the UK and France.
Are these treaties accounted for in the future vision, and what, for example, is the role of the United Kingdom, which is not an EU member, yet is on the European continent and still retains its potential?

This programme document has already been widely studied and analysed. Its abundance of declarative statements and formulations has allowed a wide circle in Ukraine to identify both advantages and shortcomings.

For us the main point remains that, despite ambitious goals declared regarding support for Ukraine, it is likely all this will be carried out without deadlines and binding mechanisms and, as a consequence, without corresponding guarantees.

Therefore, despite high expectations, Europe’s security—in practical terms—will continue to depend on the United States.

At the same time, by placing emphasis on cooperation, interaction and the competitiveness of the defence industry, the White Paper offers wide opportunities to advance our specific interests and opens a path for Ukraine, as a country outside the EU, giving it the possible opportunity one day to “enter”, on equal terms, the defence-industrial complex united by the impact of Russia.

In the absence of binding mechanisms, our principal activity will be the active promotion—at governmental, business and expert levels—of the interests of Ukraine’s defence industry as part of a potentially opening European market.

We must compete for finance, technology and production with every country that interests us, remembering that the foundation of our strength lies in our technologies and in our practices of use.

Such an approach will not only protect Ukraine; it can also turn our defence industry into a point of economic growth, as in Israel and South Korea.

Thus, despite the resolve of European countries to assume more responsibility for their own security, concrete concepts of a new defence architecture will likely only begin to take shape at some point.

Accordingly, against the backdrop of proposals to consolidate the defence industry and declarations of collective combat capabilities, the White Paper, for the period to 2030, does not plan the main thing—the formation within the EU of joint military structures and the bodies and institutions capable of directing them.

All this indicates that, despite the White Paper’s declaration that the EU will prepare to deter external armed aggression, and that for this purpose EU member states must possess the full spectrum of military capabilities, it remains unclear who within the EU will be responsible for implementing joint projects, building shared capabilities, and also commanding and employing these capabilities within, for example, joint operations or airspace control beyond NATO.

Speaking specifically of military capabilities, I also note that they can be obtained under modern conditions only through the introduction of a single, comprehensive system of transformations across several fields:

• the development and implementation of the newest technologies;
• radical reform of the defence-industrial complex under a strict state programme;
• logistics and procurement, taking into account rapid and fundamental changes in needs;
• process management not only on the battlefield but in state structures to achieve the defined political aim;
• the structure of the Defence Forces and Armed Forces as the principal bearers of capabilities;
  doctrines for the training and employment of all components of the defence forces.

It is therefore evident that, in ensuring its own security to 2030, the EU will rely only on NATO and, accordingly, on the United States. To speak of Europe’s strategic autonomy from the US is certainly premature.

In parallel, the EU will likely increase the share of its own armaments, seeking above all to expand production volumes, including those manufactured together with Ukraine.

The formation of a new European security architecture is unlikely to be treated as the foremost task by 2030. If it is considered, then only declaratively, focusing on the re-equipment of the national armed forces of the Union’s countries.

Thus, in its foreign policy, the EU will be concentrated on preserving the existing format for ensuring its own security, seeking above all to keep the United States in focus.

Accordingly, Ukraine’s inclusion as a full-fledged player in the future architecture of European security is not considered either formally or in principle, apart from the partial utilisation of our combat experience and the provision of assistance in the war with Russia—following a strategy of avoiding war by supporting the neighbour already fighting.

Plainly, while the components of a European defence system are absent, the only way to achieve the necessary integration of Ukraine into Europe’s defence system—above all air and missile defence—is to continue work with NATO and with its members that share borders with Russia or have historical cautions. This is perhaps the only way to bypass political and other blockades within the EU, though even this step carries significant geopolitical risks for member states.

Still, speaking of readiness for war as the principal factor of combat capability, I remind you that our experience of fighting precisely such a war already shows that:

• War may be long. Therefore the very organisation of the Armed Forces must be changed completely.
• New technologies have arrived on the battlefield; mastering them requires not only replacing weaponry but radically changing strategy, doctrine and training.
• War has become hybrid. It is waged with absolute brutality both at the line of contact and inside the country, using all the state’s capabilities, including informational ones.
• In modern conflicts the role of the private sector has grown and continues to grow, requiring an entirely different approach to relations between the state and private business. A public-private partnership arises, envisaging the admission of private business and foreign capital not only to production but also to the development of arms and military equipment.
• In a war of attrition, personnel are of crucial importance. Their training and education become critical. This applies not only to the management of military operations but also to the defence-industrial sphere, where, in conditions of integrating research centres and production, universities and, for example, design bureaux must also be integrated.
• The key to successful combat operations is effective logistics and materiel support. In a war of attrition these become priority targets. Such problems can no longer be solved merely by revising transport corridors. And it is important to remember that the basis of logistics is uninterrupted supplies, including electric power, which, as is now clear, must not only be conserved but defended. The same electricity, in its absence, strikes painfully at civilian infrastructure and people. This is a complex of measures in which military involvement is indispensable.
  Conclusion: European security, despite the goals declared in the document, will continue to depend on the resilience of Ukraine and its Armed Forces, as well as on future effective partnership.

As anticipated, creating a new architecture for the European continent will require at least five years, accompanied both by inertia—linked to hopes of preserving an acceptable way of life—and by the overcoming of barriers in a democratic society.

I also wish to add that over almost four years of war in Ukraine, Russia has been systematically learning to fight better. It has already built a new army that gathers, analyses and immediately implements combat experience. All this is being finalised in the development of new doctrines and training programmes.

The national composition of prisoners of war taken by the Armed Forces of Ukraine may also indicate the transfer of this unique experience to countries such as China, Iran and North Korea. This points to an inevitable large-scale reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, both during the war and, possibly, in the post-war period.

Given trends in scientific and technological progress under modern combat conditions and the completion of a fundamentally new doctrine of warfare, such reform will evidently be completed no later than 2030. These will be armed forces of robots, autonomous systems and artificial intelligence, united by experience and doctrines already in effect.

Most importantly, they will be able to scale their new capabilities to the required level. This will be a new arms race for the right to control the system of global security.

It is not difficult even today to foresee the participants in this new arms race. They are certainly not those who merely wish to rearm advantageously. I do not see all this in the structures of NATO armies, which will likely be prepared for war with armies that no longer exist.

Recalling our history, perhaps another problem of our former leaders was the postponement of unpopular steps for short-term popularity and adherence to populist promises.

Plainly, to accelerate institutional defence readiness in a democratic society, a dialogue must be conducted with that society itself. Who begins this dialogue first—European governments or the Russian army—depends on us and our partners.

Only our joint work will allow Ukraine to share not only its grief but also its unique experience of war, which will help EU states to improve their defence strategies as quickly as possible—and not only in the sphere of defence-industrial cooperation.

Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2021–2024)