France has issued a forceful call for a redefinition of European security priorities in its newly released National Strategic Review 2025, warning that the continent stands at a critical juncture.

The report, published on 13 July by the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN), presents a detailed assessment of France’s strategic environment and outlines an ambitious agenda for national and European resilience in an age of heightened geopolitical competition, eroding arms control, and intensifying hybrid threats.

Commissioned by the President of the Republic, the Review reflects the consensus of France’s senior civil and military leadership. It concludes that France and its European partners must now prepare for the possibility of a major, high-intensity conflict on European soil within the next five years. In parallel, hybrid warfare, economic coercion and digital sabotage are becoming daily features of an increasingly unstable global order.

This article presents an expanded analysis of the Review’s principal themes, focusing on Europe’s fragmented defence industrial base, nuclear deterrence strategy, the proliferation of hybrid threats, and France’s proposal for strategic consolidation and autonomous capability development within the European Union.

An Age of Strategic Fragmentation

The SGDSN identifies the strategic environment as one marked by “systemic rivalry” and an erosion of norms governing international conduct. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is cited as the most visible manifestation of this shift, but the Review notes a broader pattern: the resurgence of power politics, the decline of multilateralism, and the proliferation of grey-zone tactics that undermine traditional security structures.

China is singled out as a structural rival to the West, with global ambitions that extend well beyond its immediate region. Its political and economic model, coupled with increasing military assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific and strategic support to Russia, challenges the liberal international order on multiple fronts.

At the same time, regions across the Global South—particularly the Sahel, Horn of Africa, and Middle East—are increasingly the scene of indirect conflict between global powers. France sees its own overseas territories, including New Caledonia, Mayotte and French Guiana, as increasingly vulnerable to foreign influence and hybrid pressure.

Defence Industrial Policy: From Sclerosis to Strategic Sovereignty

A central pillar of the Review is its critique of Europe’s defence industrial architecture. France argues that the continent’s defence capabilities are constrained not by a lack of resources or technical capacity, but by institutional fragmentation, inconsistent investment, and political divergence.

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European countries continue to procure military equipment through national channels, creating redundancy, limiting interoperability, and driving up costs. Programmes such as the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) have been delayed by political disputes and industrial competition, undermining Europe’s ability to deliver next-generation capabilities on schedule.

While the European Union has launched promising instruments—including the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Strategic Compass, and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA)—the SGDSN contends that these tools remain underused and lack long-term institutional backing.

France is calling for:

• A permanent, high-level strategic dialogue among defence ministries, industries, and EU institutions;

• Streamlined certification and procurement procedures to reduce delivery times;

• A continental strategy for critical raw materials and component sourcing to reduce third-country dependencies;

• Expansion of joint stockpiling, ammunition production, and supply chain resilience planning.

The French government views defence industrial consolidation not only as a technical or economic issue, but as a foundation of strategic sovereignty. Without reliable, scalable, and integrated production capacity, France argues that Europe will remain strategically dependent on external actors.

Nuclear Deterrence in a Post-Arms Control World

The Review devotes considerable attention to the re-emergence of nuclear weapons as central to global power dynamics. France positions its own nuclear deterrent as a cornerstone of national and allied security in an environment marked by the collapse of long-standing arms control agreements.

Russia’s suspension of the New START Treaty and withdrawal from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), coupled with regular nuclear signalling and the deployment of dual-capable delivery systems, is seen as a direct challenge to strategic stability in Europe. Concurrently, China is rapidly increasing its nuclear stockpile, with estimates suggesting it could possess more than 1,000 operational warheads by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035.

France maintains a dual-component nuclear deterrent:

• Maritime component: Four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SNLE) equipped with M51 missiles;

• Airborne component: ASMPA cruise missiles delivered by Rafale fighters, to be succeeded by the ASN4G missile currently under development.

The Review confirms that the ASN4G programme remains a priority and will be integrated into both current and future-generation platforms. France reiterates its policy of strict sufficiency and independence, while calling for increased strategic dialogue with European partners on deterrence concepts, especially in light of growing uncertainty over U.S. extended deterrence guarantees.

Although not seeking a European nuclear force, Paris suggests that existing nuclear powers within the EU should coordinate on signalling and posture to ensure coherence in crisis scenarios.

The Grey-Zone Challenge: Hybrid Warfare and Civil Resilience

Perhaps the most significant evolution in the 2025 Review lies in its treatment of hybrid threats, which are no longer portrayed as secondary or complementary to conventional warfare, but as a primary tool of coercion and destabilisation.

According to the SGDSN, France has faced a growing number of state-sponsored cyber intrusions, particularly against energy networks, health systems, and critical infrastructure. Attribution remains politically sensitive, but the Review explicitly identifies Russia and China—often operating via proxies or front companies—as leading actors in this domain.

The hybrid threat spectrum identified includes:

• Cyber attacks and ransomware campaigns;

• Foreign disinformation and influence operations targeting elections and democratic institutions;

• Economic coercion and supply chain disruption;

• Strategic use of litigation and regulatory manipulation (“lawfare”);

• Sabotage operations, including undersea cable tampering and GPS jamming.

To counter these threats, France is pursuing a “whole-of-nation” approach that blends military, civilian, and private-sector responses. This includes:

• Expansion of the role of the National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI);

• Real-time collaboration between intelligence agencies, telecoms operators, and utility companies;

• Investment in artificial intelligence to monitor and counter foreign information operations;

• Development of legal tools to sanction and deter economic coercion;

• Civic education programmes to enhance societal awareness and psychological resilience.

The Review also highlights the vulnerability of France’s overseas territories, which face growing hybrid pressure due to their geographic position, economic dependencies, and limited security infrastructure.

Strategic Autonomy: A European Imperative

France uses the Review to reiterate its vision of European strategic autonomy—not as an alternative to NATO, but as a complementary and increasingly necessary capability. The United States, while still a vital ally, is seen as increasingly preoccupied with its Indo-Pacific commitments and domestic constraints. European states must therefore be prepared to assume greater responsibility for their own security.

France proposes a layered approach:

• At the national level: Continued modernisation of French armed forces, including cyber, space, electronic warfare, and long-range strike capabilities;

• At the European level: Consolidation of defence planning, procurement, and operational integration through EU structures;

• At the societal level: Embedding a culture of strategic awareness, including civilian mobilisation capacity and psychological resilience to hybrid interference.

The Review suggests establishing a permanent European Defence Council, coordinating closely with the European External Action Service, NATO, and national capitals. It also supports expanded joint exercises, co-financed military R&D, and the deployment of rapid reaction forces under both NATO and EU command.

Conclusion: A Call to Strategic Maturity

France’s National Strategic Review 2025 sets out a clear message: the age of relative security on the European continent is over. The threats now facing Europe are multidimensional—ranging from conventional military force to sub-threshold digital coercion—and demand a comprehensive strategic response that goes beyond traditional defence planning.

France believes it has identified both the scale of the challenge and the tools required to meet it. But the Review is also a warning: without stronger political will, institutional reform, and financial investment, Europe risks entering a period of sustained strategic vulnerability. The choice, Paris argues, is not between autonomy and alliance, but between strategic maturity and dependency in an increasingly hostile world.

Whether its partners in Brussels, Berlin, Warsaw, and beyond are prepared to meet this challenge remains to be seen.

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