Pokrovsk has become the latest case study in how rapidly evolving battlefield technology is being constrained by something as old-fashioned as the weather.

As dense fog and autumn rain settle over the eastern Ukrainian city, both Russian and Ukrainian forces are being forced to adapt, with Russia exploiting conditions that blunt Ukraine’s advantage in first-person-view (FPV) drones.

Ukrainian units in Pokrovsk report that heavy fog has sharply reduced the effective range of FPV and reconnaissance drones that had previously dominated the battlespace. Operators struggle to identify targets beyond a few hundred metres, while wet conditions degrade electronics and optics and make launch sites harder to conceal. With visibility cut and GPS links less reliable in built-up areas, drone strikes that once halted advances in open terrain are now less consistent, especially in close-quarter fighting amid multi-storey buildings.

Russian forces have seized on this window. Reporting from the city suggests that assault units, often moving on motorbikes, light vehicles and on foot, have used the cover of fog to push deeper into urban districts, closing the distance before Ukrainian drone operators can react. In several cases, Russian infantry have approached along backyards, alleys and building interiors, using the city’s war-damaged layout as a shield against aerial surveillance.

The shift from open-field to street-by-street combat has been accompanied by changes in Russian tactics. Analysts tracking the Pokrovsk offensive note that Moscow has increasingly relied on small, dispersed assault groups – typically a few dozen troops – rather than large mechanised columns. These groups probe Ukrainian lines for weak points, then attempt to infiltrate, bypass and outflank defensive positions rather than smash through them head-on.

Around Pokrovsk, this approach is combined with systematic efforts to cut key roads and secondary tracks linking the city to Myrnohrad and to Ukrainian logistics hubs further west. Russian forces have pressed attacks in the Pokrovsk–Rodynske–Dobropillia sector, aiming to interdict supply and evacuation routes and create what military analysts describe as a “pocket” or salient containing Ukrainian units. Even partial fire control of these routes complicates Ukrainian resupply and rotation, while increasing the pressure on Kyiv to decide whether to reinforce or withdraw.

According to open-source assessments, Russia now controls roughly half of Pokrovsk, with fighting turning parts of the city into a “frontline maze” of contested blocks, destroyed housing and shifting positions.  Close-quarters combat in this environment tends to favour well-prepared assault infantry, particularly when weather conditions reduce the effectiveness of precision drone and artillery fire. For Ukrainian defenders, the urban terrain still offers opportunities for ambushes and counter-attacks, but at the cost of higher infantry casualties and constant risk of encirclement at the micro-tactical level – individual buildings, courtyards and intersections.

These local developments feed into a wider operational and political dilemma for Ukraine’s leadership. The Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad area has significant logistical and symbolic importance: it is a key node in the Donetsk region’s transport network and has become a focus of Ukrainian efforts to stabilise the front after earlier withdrawals from places such as Avdiivka and Severodonetsk.

Military logic points towards a familiar calculation. If Russian forces continue to advance on the flanks, degrade the main supply routes and establish strongpoints within the urban area, Ukrainian troops in the salient could face increasing risks to their lines of communication. In previous battles, Kyiv has at times delayed withdrawals in order to gain time, inflict further losses, or avoid the domestic and international impact of conceding key locations, before eventually ordering pull-backs to shorter, more defensible lines.

The debate now emerging around Pokrovsk follows a similar pattern. Ukrainian field commanders emphasise the need to preserve experienced units and avoid being fixed in positions that are tactically disadvantageous once Russian artillery and aviation are brought to bear at close range. External assessments suggest that Russia is likely to capture both Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in due course, but also that this will probably be a gradual process involving further heavy losses.

Political considerations, however, run in parallel. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has publicly rejected the idea that Ukrainian troops should “die for the sake of ruins”, while at the same time insisting that every effort will be made to hold strategically important urban centres. For Kyiv, the fall of another major town in Donetsk would be seized on by Moscow as evidence of momentum and could affect Western perceptions of the war’s trajectory at a time when Ukrainian leaders are seeking to maintain or expand military support.

The result is a tension between the tactical and the symbolic. Holding the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad pocket binds Russian forces and forces them to fight costly urban battles under difficult conditions, particularly when the weather clears and Ukrainian drones regain their effectiveness. Withdrawing too early, conversely, would concede ground and infrastructure that may still be defensible, while risking a perception of continual retreat.

For now, Ukraine appears to be pursuing a middle course: reinforcing critical sectors, conducting local counter-attacks to keep Russian units off balance, and preparing fallback lines further west. As winter sets in, the balance between drones and infantry, fog and visibility, will continue to shape the battle for Pokrovsk – and with it, the broader question of how Ukraine manages threatened salients without exhausting its forces or weakening its political position.