A Spanish Air and Space Force A330 carrying Defence Minister Margarita Robles reported a satellite-navigation disturbance on 24 September while transiting the vicinity of Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave en route to Šiauliai air base, Lithuania.

Spain’s defence ministry said the crew maintained course using alternative procedures and military satellite support; the flight continued without incident and the programme in Lithuania went ahead.

The episode aligns with a pattern of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference recorded across the Baltic region since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Aviation and maritime operators have reported frequent jamming (signal blocking) and spoofing (false position data), with effects observed from northern Poland to Finland and Estonia. European carriers and state flights have previously diverted or reverted to conventional navigation methods during such events.

Open-source research this year has narrowed probable sources of interference in Kaliningrad. An international team led by Jarosław Cydejko of Gdynia Maritime University, working with partners in Poland and the United States, established monitoring stations around Gdańsk Bay to triangulate emitters. Their findings, published in July, place repeated jamming and spoofing transmissions within roughly one kilometre of two coastal locations: near the Okunevo antenna complex on Kaliningrad’s central coast, and in or around Baltiysk, home to the Russian Baltic Fleet and associated electronic-warfare infrastructure.

Researchers report a shift in 2025 from predominantly jamming to increased spoofing activity, a technique that replaces genuine satellite signals with fabricated ones and can mislead receivers and autopilots unless cross-checked. While GNSS interference can be mounted using relatively compact equipment, analysts note that the Kaliningrad sites are proximate to established military antenna fields and units, including those previously associated with long-range electronic systems.

Authorities in the Baltic states and several EU members have attributed the disruptions to Russian activity and raised the matter with international bodies. In March, eight European countries, including the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, France, the Netherlands and Ukraine, lodged complaints at the United Nations, and the issue has been taken up by the International Maritime Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Telecommunication Union. Moscow has not publicly detailed its position on the specific emissions in question.

Operationally, standard procedures mitigate risk when GNSS becomes unreliable. Flight crews revert to inertial reference systems, radio beacons and air traffic control vectors; certified military aircraft also employ protected channels and alternative satellite services. Spain’s account of Wednesday’s event indicated that the A330’s systems and crew managed the disturbance as designed.

The European Commission and member states have begun technical and policy responses. Earlier this year the EU advanced upgrades to its Galileo ground segment amid concerns over resilience to jamming and spoofing. Industry and research programmes are developing complementary terrestrial navigation back-ups, including the R-Mode Baltic initiative, which leverages land-based radio beacons to provide positioning independent of satellites. The United Kingdom operates eLoran as an additional low-frequency system; other countries are testing comparable solutions.

Independent analytics indicate that interference fields centred on Kaliningrad can affect aircraft at significant ranges because signals travel line-of-sight, with high-altitude receivers encountering jamming farther out than ships at sea level. Atmospheric conditions may modulate reception in more distant locations, producing intermittent effects reported along the Polish coast. Monitoring networks continue to map horizons of first detection using aircraft-broadcast data quality indicators to refine likely emitter locations around the Baltic rim.

Wednesday’s disturbance coincided with Robles’s planned meetings with Lithuanian Defence Minister Dovilė Šakalienė and visits to Spanish personnel supporting NATO missions. The Šiauliai base hosts Allied air-policing rotations; Spanish aircraft and crews are regular contributors. Spanish officials characterised the interference as a known feature of the route and said the aircraft is equipped to counter it.

GNSS interference has also affected other high-profile flights this year, including that of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on approach to Bulgaria, according to regional reporting and official statements. European carriers and national regulators continue to issue notices to airmen regarding possible navigation unreliability in the Baltic area and adjacent airspace.

The Spanish event adds to a documented series of incidents concentrated around Kaliningrad and the Gulf of Finland. While attribution for individual emissions can be technically complex, current monitoring and triangulation work supports the assessment that electronic-warfare assets positioned in Russia’s Baltic territories are responsible for persistent GNSS disruption affecting both civil and state operators.

Von der Leyen flight hit by suspected GPS interference over Bulgaria