For years, the Sahel – the vast, semi-arid stretch of land linking the Sahara to sub-Saharan Africa – has been simmering under a deadly mix of jihadist insurgency, ethnic tensions, and state fragility.

Today, it stands at the precipice of a deeper crisis, one whose reverberations could soon reach Europe’s borders in ways policymakers cannot ignore. Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad, once considered marginal theatres of conflict, are now proving to be epicentres of insecurity with direct consequences for the continent across the Mediterranean.

The region’s instability is not new. Since 2012, Mali has been the scene of a dramatic jihadist insurgency, initially confined to the north but now spreading southwards with alarming rapidity. Groups affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have taken root, exploiting governance vacuums, ethnic rivalries, and porous borders. In Niger and Burkina Faso, similar patterns have emerged. Rural communities find themselves trapped between jihadists and state security forces, often paying the ultimate price.

In Chad, the death of Idriss Déby in 2021 exposed the fragility of a system long dominated by coercion rather than political legitimacy, leaving the country vulnerable to both internal unrest and cross-border insurgencies.

Europe’s exposure to this crisis is both direct and indirect. On a direct level, terrorist groups in the Sahel have, for years, demonstrated an ability to project violence beyond Africa. Attacks in Paris, Brussels, and London have traced back to networks that found their operational and ideological incubation in Sahelian sanctuaries.

The EU and its member states, particularly France, have invested heavily in counterterrorism efforts, from Operation Barkhane to the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali. Yet despite these interventions, the threat has not abated. If anything, the increasing sophistication of jihadist tactics – including remote coordination, drone reconnaissance, and targeted assassinations of community leaders – suggests a long-term entrenchment that Europe may struggle to counter.

Indirectly, the Sahel crisis exacerbates migration pressures. As villages are razed and livelihoods destroyed, thousands are forced to flee, seeking refuge in safer regions. Many head south to coastal West Africa, but a significant proportion attempt the perilous journey across the Sahara and through Libya to reach Europe. The 2023 reports from the International Organization for Migration highlighted an unprecedented spike in migrant flows from Mali and Burkina Faso, with many perishing in the desert or at sea.

European nations, already politically sensitive to migration, face not just a humanitarian challenge but a profound domestic political dilemma. The question is no longer whether the Sahel will affect Europe but how severe the impact will be, and whether Brussels can formulate a coherent, credible response.

Complicating matters further is the recent surge in coups and military takeovers across the Sahel. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have all witnessed coups since 2020, signalling a dangerous trend in which democratic institutions are increasingly subordinated to military rule. While some analysts argue that such interventions could restore order, the evidence from the ground is less encouraging. Military regimes often struggle to establish legitimacy, fail to deliver basic services, and sometimes exacerbate ethnic divisions. In Mali, for example, the junta’s reliance on Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group has alarmed European capitals, raising questions about the long-term orientation of the country’s security apparatus and the potential erosion of Western influence.

Ethnic and communal tensions further complicate the Sahel’s security landscape. In Burkina Faso, Fulani herders and Mossi farmers have been locked in cycles of violence, often manipulated or exacerbated by jihadist groups seeking to expand their reach. In Niger, the diffusion of weapons and the proliferation of local militias threaten to transform the region into a patchwork of armed enclaves, each with its own set of rules. Such fragmentation makes conventional counterterrorism strategies less effective and raises the likelihood of prolonged instability. For Europe, this is a strategic challenge: a region fragmented along ethnic, religious, and ideological lines is far harder to stabilise, yet it continues to generate threats beyond its borders.

Europe’s responses have been varied but are increasingly under strain. France, historically the principal military actor in the region, has reduced its troop presence while simultaneously warning of the risks of jihadist expansion. Brussels has attempted to coordinate EU missions and provide development aid, yet these efforts are hampered by political instability on the ground and a growing reluctance among European publics to fund interventions that seem interminable. The dilemma is stark: disengage and risk the Sahel becoming a permanent jihadist safe haven, or double down on a costly and politically sensitive military presence. Neither option is without peril.

The humanitarian consequences of continued instability cannot be understated. Food insecurity is rampant. According to the World Food Programme, the Sahel faces one of the gravest hunger crises in decades, with millions of children at risk of malnutrition. The combination of conflict, climate change, and economic disruption has rendered traditional coping mechanisms ineffective. For Europe, this translates into both immediate and long-term responsibilities: immediate in terms of providing humanitarian aid, and long-term in managing the social and political consequences of mass displacement.

There is also an economic dimension to consider. The Sahel is rich in minerals and energy resources, from uranium in Niger to gold in Burkina Faso. Instability threatens extraction, supply chains, and foreign investment, which in turn can affect European industries reliant on these materials. Beyond the tangible economic implications, there is a broader strategic risk: the longer Europe allows instability to fester, the more it cedes influence to external actors such as Russia and China, who are increasingly active in the region. The Wagner Group’s presence in Mali is emblematic of this shift, signalling a potential realignment that may undermine European interests over the long term.

Addressing the Sahel’s crises requires a nuanced understanding that goes beyond military intervention. Development, governance, and regional cooperation are as vital as counterterrorism. The G5 Sahel – a regional coalition of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger – represents a potential framework for collective action, yet its effectiveness has been hampered by internal divisions, lack of resources, and divergent national priorities. European policy must therefore balance immediate security needs with long-term state-building and economic development strategies, recognising that military solutions alone cannot resolve the underlying causes of unrest.

In addition, Europe must reckon with its own internal political environment. Populist and nationalist movements have made migration a central electoral issue in countries such as France, Italy, and Germany. Policymakers must navigate a delicate balance between humanitarian responsibility, security imperatives, and domestic political pressures. Failure to do so risks both short-term crises – such as unmanageable migration flows – and longer-term strategic setbacks in a region critical to European security.

Ultimately, the Sahel is a test of Europe’s capacity to manage instability on its periphery. It is a region where the lines between terrorism, humanitarian disaster, and state fragility blur, creating a multidimensional threat that is unlikely to dissipate in the near term. Europe’s choices today will determine not only the fate of millions of Sahelian civilians but also the broader security landscape of the continent itself. Ignoring the Sahel is no longer an option; engagement, whether through military, diplomatic, or developmental means, is unavoidable. The question is whether Europe has the political will, coherence, and resources to meet this challenge effectively.

In short, the Sahel is no longer a distant concern for Europe. It is a proximate, pressing, and multidimensional crisis whose consequences are already unfolding on European soil. From terrorism to migration, from economic disruption to geopolitical competition, the stakes could scarcely be higher. European leaders who fail to grasp this reality risk watching instability in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad metastasise into a direct and enduring threat.

Main Image: By Fasokan – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=54032761