The European Union’s decision to launch a €150 billion defence loan instrument – dubbed “SAFE” – marks a dramatic departure from decades of post-Cold War complacency.

But make no mistake: this is not a show of strength. It is a panic response to the consequences of wilful blindness. After years of underfunding, delusions of “soft power,” and dependence on the American umbrella, Europe is suddenly realising it may soon have to stand on its own feet. And it is woefully unprepared.

The Strategic Arms for Europe (SAFE) fund is being presented by Brussels as a breakthrough: a way for member states to pool resources to finance air defence systems, drones, and vital military infrastructure. In practice, it is an admission that the continent has run out of time and options. There are no guarantees that this debt-driven scheme will produce the results it promises, and many signs that it will prove another bloated bureaucracy chasing its own tail.

The idea is simple enough. The European Investment Bank, in coordination with the Commission, will help member states borrow at favourable rates to finance joint defence projects – from surface-to-air missile batteries to satellite reconnaissance. These will, theoretically, fill the gaping holes in Europe’s military capabilities. But one has to ask: why is this happening only now?

The answer is as uncomfortable as it is obvious. For years, European governments hollowed out their armed forces, believing the world had moved beyond war. Germany famously let its Leopard tanks rust in sheds. Belgium phased out its heavy artillery and armour. Italian, Spanish and Portuguese procurement was routinely delayed or cancelled altogether. Even France, which prides itself on maintaining a global military profile, has struggled to replenish munitions after supporting Ukraine.

Throughout this period, the EU poured billions into climate targets, social funds, and diversity initiatives – everything, in fact, except hard power. European strategic autonomy was a slogan, not a policy. That posture might have held if the geopolitical weather had remained calm. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shattered the illusion. Now, the continent finds itself scrambling.

The SAFE initiative is billed as a response to the new reality. Yet it raises as many questions as it seeks to answer. Will joint borrowing solve the real problem – namely, a chronic unwillingness among many member states to spend meaningful sums on defence? Or will it simply shift the burden to Brussels, allowing national governments to virtue-signal while offloading responsibility?

Moreover, there is the issue of execution. EU defence projects have a poor track record. The PESCO initiative, launched in 2017 with great fanfare, has delivered little of substance. Europe’s attempt to build a joint drone – the Eurodrone – is years behind schedule and several billion over budget. Coordinated procurement across 27 member states with divergent interests, industrial bases, and strategic cultures is easier said than done.

The SAFE fund also raises the spectre of deeper fiscal integration under the cover of security. By taking on collective debt for military purposes, Brussels is inching closer to a defence union in all but name. This will delight federalists in the Commission and certain European capitals. But it should trouble those who value democratic accountability. The more power is centralised in EU institutions, the harder it becomes for national parliaments – and by extension voters – to control how their money is spent and what it is used for.

One need only look at the euphemistic language of the announcement to spot the direction of travel. The fund, we are told, will “foster interoperability and resilience in strategic domains” while “addressing capability shortfalls in critical sectors.” It will “facilitate cross-border synergies” and “enable agile funding mechanisms.” Such jargon masks a deeper truth: this is an effort to consolidate European defence under supranational management.

Even if one were to accept that a stronger EU role in defence is desirable – a point many in Central and Eastern Europe would dispute – it is far from clear that Brussels is up to the task. The same Commission that presided over vaccine procurement delays, failed green subsidy schemes, and incoherent migration policy now wants to coordinate missile defence and battlefield logistics.

All of this comes at a time when the United States, Europe’s traditional security guarantor, is sending increasingly mixed signals. With a potential second Trump presidency on the horizon, Europeans are rightly concerned that NATO’s centre of gravity may shift – or implode. That fear is driving urgency. But haste makes for bad policy. Pouring borrowed billions into ill-defined projects may generate headlines, but it won’t generate credible deterrence.

What Europe truly needs is not a top-down loan instrument, but a bottom-up reckoning. Member states must accept that hard power matters – and fund it accordingly from their own budgets. Defence is not a luxury or a symbolic gesture; it is a fundamental duty of the state. No amount of Brussels-led financial engineering can replace national will.

The SAFE fund is, in many ways, a symptom of Europe’s strategic incoherence. It is a hurried attempt to manufacture cohesion where little exists. It may offer a temporary salve, but it will not cure the underlying ailment: the absence of political seriousness in the face of rising threats.

Until Europe sheds its illusions and faces the world as it is – not as it would like it to be – even €150 billion will be a mere drop in a very dangerous ocean.