It is the kind of question that used to be whispered in think tanks and war colleges—an abstract exercise for Europe’s policymakers and generals.

Now it is being asked aloud in parliaments, defence ministries, and increasingly anxious households from Vilnius to Lisbon: just how prepared is Europe for war?

With Vladimir Putin’s war machine grinding on in Ukraine, American strategic focus wavering under the spectre of a second Trump presidency, and China eyeing Taiwan, Europe is being dragged into a new era of geopolitical realism. The days of “soft power” are over. But the question remains whether the EU’s 27 member states, individually or collectively, are ready to face the hard choices required by this new era, and whether the European Commission is a help or a hindrance in doing so.

A Fragmented Arsenal

Europe’s military patchwork remains its greatest liability. Despite having over 1.5 million personnel in uniform, the bloc suffers from chronic duplication, underinvestment, and logistical incoherence. EU states operate more than 20 different types of fighter jets and 17 different battle tank models. NATO officials privately lament that Europe has over 15 different classes of frigates—and none of them talk to each other.

France has nuclear weapons but little in the way of heavy lift or forward logistics. Germany has money and industrial muscle but can barely keep its tanks operational. The Baltics are staunch, but small. Southern states like Italy and Spain lack strategic reach, while the Nordics, recently bolstered by Sweden’s NATO accession, are among the most motivated but cannot cover the continent’s defence on their own.

European armies have shrunk dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The Bundeswehr, once the West’s armoured bulwark, is now a hollow shell of its former self. In 1990, Germany had over 4,000 Leopard tanks. Today, it has barely 300, many of which are not combat-ready.

Brussels’ Paper Shields

Into this mess steps the European Commission, eager to position itself as a unifying force in Europe’s defence renaissance. Ursula von der Leyen, herself a former German defence minister, albeit one remembered for the wrong reasons, has pushed for greater EU-level coordination. But critics argue that Brussels has so far produced more rhetoric than reinforcements.

The EU’s grandly titled European Defence Fund (EDF), launched in 2021, pledged €8 billion to encourage collaborative military projects. But this is a pittance compared to the scale of investment required. For comparison, the UK alone plans to spend £55 billion on defence in 2024.

The Commission’s other big initiative, the Strategic Compass, released in 2022, laid out a plan for a 5,000-strong rapid deployment force. That number barely constitutes a brigade—and there is no sign that it will be operational any time soon. Its deployment criteria remain murky, its command structure untested, and member states are reluctant to commit troops without national oversight.

Indeed, much of the EU’s defence activity exists on paper. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework, intended to harmonise development and procurement, has spawned over 60 joint projects—most of which are stalled or duplicative.

As one Eastern European diplomat put it bluntly, “The Commission holds more conferences than rifles.”

The Franco-German Mirage

The traditional axis of EU integration—France and Germany—was supposed to provide the locomotive for Europe’s military awakening. But cracks in the alliance are now impossible to ignore.

France continues to tout “strategic autonomy”, originally a Gaullist doctrine that envisions Europe defending itself without NATO. Emmanuel Macron has tried to elevate the EU into a global military actor, calling for a “true European army”. Yet this has won few converts. Eastern states, especially Poland and the Baltics, view such rhetoric as a distraction from the hard truth: Europe remains dependent on American military power.

Germany, for its part, declared a historic “Zeitenwende”—a turning point—after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, pledging €100 billion to rebuild its armed forces. But most of that money remains unspent. Bureaucracy, procurement delays, and political squeamishness have slowed implementation to a crawl. The promised “war economy” has yet to materialise.

And while Berlin and Paris talk of defence leadership, their failure to agree on joint tank or fighter jet programmes—delayed by years of wrangling—exposes the hollowness of their ambitions.

The Eastern Awakening

In contrast, Eastern and Nordic states are taking the threat seriously. Poland now spends over 4% of its GDP on defence, more than any NATO member apart from the United States. It is building Europe’s largest land army and has ordered hundreds of modern tanks, artillery systems, and aircraft—many from the US and South Korea.

Finland, newly joined to NATO, has a mobilisation system the envy of Western Europe. Its army can rapidly swell from 19,000 to 280,000 trained reservists. Sweden, too, is reinvesting in territorial defence after decades of dormancy.

These nations understand what Brussels and Berlin have yet to accept: war is no longer an abstract concept. It is next door. And the frontline may shift.

The American Question

Much of Europe’s complacency stems from a habitual reliance on the United States. For decades, Washington underwrote the continent’s security, allowing EU states to hollow out their defences. But with Donald Trump threatening to withdraw support for NATO unless allies spend more, the security guarantee is no longer absolute.

Europe’s attempts to compensate have been underwhelming. The EU still lacks strategic enablers—tankers, satellites, heavy airlift—that make operations viable. Without US logistics, surveillance, and firepower, most EU militaries could not sustain more than a few weeks of combat in a high-intensity conflict.

This is the crux of the problem: the European Commission may want to help, but it lacks the mandate, the money, and the urgency. Meanwhile, national governments still treat defence as a national prerogative. And the results show.

Is Brussels Helping or Hindering?

So is the European Commission helping? It is trying. It has encouraged joint procurement, lobbied for more defence spending, and highlighted capability gaps. But it remains constrained by treaties and political will.

Where it hinders, critics say, is in its tendency to focus on process over performance. Too much emphasis on “European solutions” means delays, duplication, and sometimes even poorer equipment. A pan-EU drone programme may tick boxes in Brussels but fail to deliver anything usable before 2030. Meanwhile, national procurement from proven systems—Israeli drones, Korean howitzers, American jets—is quietly doing the job.

Moreover, the Commission’s obsession with “defence as industrial policy”, supporting EU-only firms at the expense of speed or effectiveness, has slowed urgent modernisation. It may be good for Dassault or Rheinmetall in the long term, but it is less helpful for a Polish officer staring at the Suwałki Gap today.

What Must Be Done?

If Europe is serious about defending itself, it must do several things—and quickly.

First, it must drastically increase defence spending. The 2% NATO target must become a floor, not a ceiling. Secondly, it must harmonise procurement around proven platforms. Germany and Poland should not be fielding entirely different tank fleets. Thirdly, logistics and readiness need to be prioritised over paper armies. A battalion on standby is more useful than a division on PowerPoint.

Finally, the EU should support—but not control—these efforts. The Commission can play a useful role in funding joint projects, streamlining regulations, and coordinating supply chains. But it should avoid trying to run military affairs through bureaucratic fiat.

War is not won by white papers or glossy brochures. It is won by resolve, capability, and preparedness.

Europe’s enemies are watching. So far, the signals are mixed.

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