General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has issued a clear warning: Russia remains committed to achieving its strategic objective of subjugating Ukraine, and Kyiv must therefore prepare for a war that could extend well beyond the current campaign.

His message, delivered in an extensive interview with RBC-Ukraine on 18 August, is not only directed at domestic audiences but also carries implications for NATO and the European security architecture.

Battlefield assessment

Syrskyi described the current front as “difficult,” shaped by Russia’s ongoing strategic offensive. Moscow is concentrating its efforts in the Pokrovsk sector of Donetsk and is redeploying units to Zaporizhzhia. “At present about fifty assault actions by the enemy are recorded every day,” he said. Russian forces, he explained, are pursuing a tactic of attrition: small assault groups infiltrating Ukrainian positions across a broad front, exploiting terrain features and gaps in the defensive line.

The Sumy offensive, however, has been blunted. “Despite concentrating powerful forces – paratroopers, marines and their best motor rifle units – the enemy had no success there for two months. On the contrary, they lost several settlements and were pushed back across the state border,” Syrskyi reported. Those formations are now being shifted southwards, underlining Russia’s persistence in seeking a breakthrough.

Despite some tactical gains, Syrskyi emphasised the attritional costs. “Each kilometre of our land costs the enemy enormous losses,” he said. The Kremlin, however, appears willing to expend manpower and equipment in pursuit of limited objectives, a reality that underscores the grinding nature of the conflict.

Russia’s losses and Ukrainian resilience

Syrskyi’s comments reinforce the pattern observed since 2022: Russia is prepared to absorb heavy casualties, but Ukraine has adapted by employing more flexible tactics and technological innovation. He pointed to the battle for Bakhmut as a decisive moment that broke Wagner Group as a coherent fighting force. “In Bakhmut, Wagner found its death as an organisation,” Syrskyi stated, noting that up to 40,000 Wagner fighters were killed or wounded there.

Similarly, the Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk region in 2024 disrupted Moscow’s plans and forced it to redeploy elite units. According to Syrskyi, Ukrainian forces inflicted casualty ratios of five-to-one during this operation.

These examples highlight a key trend: while Russia relies on mass, Ukraine seeks to offset its smaller mobilisation pool through quality, adaptability and technology.

Technology as a force multiplier

The Commander-in-Chief repeatedly stressed Ukraine’s focus on technological solutions to counterbalance Russia’s numerical superiority. “We are betting on high-tech weapons and systems that will reduce the direct presence of our servicemen on the battlefield,” he explained. This includes unmanned platforms for reconnaissance, logistics and combat, as well as AI-enabled air defence systems and counter-drone interceptors.

Army aviation has been particularly effective: helicopter units have downed more than 3,200 Shahed drones over the past year. Ukraine is also developing indigenous interceptor drones capable of competing with established international systems. Syrskyi revealed that 15,000 robotic ground platforms of various types are scheduled for delivery to frontline units in 2025.

For NATO planners, Ukraine is emerging as a testing ground for the integration of artificial intelligence and robotics into modern warfare. Kyiv’s emphasis on autonomous systems reflects broader trends that will shape the future battlefield, where human resources are limited and the pace of combat demands machine-augmented decision-making.

Structural reform and command resilience

The Armed Forces are also undergoing structural reform. Ukraine is moving to a corps-based system designed to streamline command and reduce the number of subordinate brigades each headquarters must manage. Syrskyi described this as “a very positive step forward,” enabling corps to conduct independent operations with their own artillery, air defence, electronic warfare and unmanned systems.

Critics argue that insufficient manpower risks turning the reform into “rebranding without substance.” Syrskyi countered that effective command is essential, even with reduced numbers. “An ineffective commander means the loss of our servicemen and territory. An effective commander is the key to success.”

This debate mirrors wider NATO discussions on force design. The question is whether large, manpower-heavy formations remain viable in a high-intensity war of attrition, or whether more modular, technology-centred structures can deliver equivalent effect. Ukraine’s experience suggests the latter is increasingly necessary.

Implications for NATO and Europe

Syrskyi’s central message – that Ukraine must always prepare for renewed Russian aggression, regardless of negotiations or ceasefires – has wider resonance. “Even in the event of peace, we must constantly care for the army’s combat readiness and build the most modern, most powerful, high-tech force,” he warned.

This reflects a recognition that Russia is unlikely to abandon its strategic objective of dominating Ukraine. For European capitals, the lesson is clear: Moscow’s long-term challenge to the post-Cold War order will not be resolved at the negotiating table alone. The same conclusion has been voiced by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who has cautioned that Europe must plan for decades of confrontation with Russia.

Ukraine’s trajectory also affects NATO’s own defence posture. Kyiv is effectively serving as the eastern shield of Europe, testing Western systems under real combat conditions and providing operational insights into Russian doctrine. The technologies Ukraine is fielding – from drone swarms to AI-assisted targeting – are being developed and deployed at a pace unmatched within NATO itself. For the Alliance, supporting Ukraine is therefore not only a matter of solidarity but also of learning.

Sustaining support and industrial capacity

Syrskyi’s emphasis on technology raises questions of sustainability. Ukraine’s capacity to scale drone production, integrate AI, and maintain a steady supply of interceptors depends heavily on Western support and industrial cooperation. While Kyiv is accelerating its domestic defence industry, Europe faces its own challenges of scale and stockpile depletion.

If Ukraine is to maintain parity on the battlefield, the European defence sector must expand production of air defence systems, artillery shells, and unmanned platforms. This aligns with recent EU and NATO initiatives to increase joint procurement and establish long-term frameworks for supporting Kyiv.

Lessons for European defence

Beyond material support, Syrskyi’s analysis points to a larger lesson: modern European armies must be built with an assumption of enduring confrontation with Russia. Negotiated freezes, as he observed, merely allow Moscow to regroup. “The enemy used the ‘May ceasefire’ simply to move artillery and drone units to the front line. We must be ready for any development,” he cautioned.

For European defence policy, this reinforces the case for sustained investment in readiness, rapid deployment and high-technology systems, rather than reliance on short-term peace settlements. NATO’s new regional defence plans and the EU’s ambition to coordinate defence industrial output are responses to precisely this reality.

Conclusion

General Syrskyi’s assessment is both tactical and strategic. On the ground, his forces continue to resist Russian advances with innovation and flexibility. At the strategic level, his warning is stark: Ukraine, and by extension Europe, must remain in a permanent state of readiness for conflict with Russia.

“The threat will remain, because the enemy does not give up its plans to seize all of Ukraine,” he said. For NATO members, his words underline that the war in Ukraine is not a distant crisis but a defining test of Europe’s collective security.