An Inuit proverb says: “Even the strongest eagle cannot fly higher than the stars.” But this truth does not apply to Trump. If one cannot soar higher, then the star must be brought down to earth. And that is what happened.

The star of American power and authority ended up under the feet of the Manhattan big dealer, applauding the Kremlin führer on the red carpet. This brings to mind a lesser dealer — Witkoff, who placed his hand over his heart when meeting Putin during one of his trips to Moscow.

There was no shortage of versions and predictions as to what would happen, what conclusions the heads of the Kremlin and the White House would reach, both before and after the Anchorage summit. It is not always worth judging by press leaks and Trump’s own “revelations” in his social media. One should pay attention to what is not spoken of, or only mentioned in passing. And what is spoken of often serves to distract from what has actually been agreed and is being concealed. Yet a few days after the gathering, much had already become clear.

It seems that the main result of Alaska is not simply an agreement to agree, but rather a corridor of opportunities created for Ukraine — a choice between a bad and a very bad scenario. Each side (this time not about Trump and Putin personally, but about the US and Russia) presents the summit as its own victory. Russian propaganda speaks of overcoming the Kremlin’s political isolation, while Trumpaganda speaks of a “path to a peace deal”, already expected “next week”.

Post-Alaska Turbo Mode

Before the smell of jet fuel from Trump’s and Putin’s planes had even dissipated over Anchorage, the White House occupant switched on turbo mode for the “peace process” — on the 18th, he invited Zelenskyy to Washington (already known to be without a red carpet for the Ukrainian president), and on the 22nd he wants to hold a trilateral summit with Zelenskyy and Putin. Donnie is in a hurry. Was he frightened by Putin’s hints-threats, who twice emphasised how glad he was to see Trump alive, or was it something else?

On the one hand, the Nobel Committee’s session in Oslo is rapidly approaching, and a peace deal on the “Ukrainian crisis” is nowhere in sight. Trump is obsessed with the Nobel. But that is not the only reason for the rush. He has likely been informed that on 31 August in Tianjin, China, the 25th summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) will open. This will not be an ordinary meeting — it will be the largest SCO summit ever, with more than 20 countries and 10 international organisations. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi will attend after a five-year absence due to strained relations with China. The Kremlin führer is also expected, although not yet confirmed, but it is already known that a Russia–India–China (RIC) format meeting is being prepared on the sidelines. The last such format took place back in 2018 at the G20 in Buenos Aires. Xi Jinping will present his vision of a new multipolar world, where the West no longer plays the leading role and the future belongs to Eurasia, centred on China.

Against this backdrop, Trump’s MAGA and Trump himself will look pitiful if he cannot pressure Ukraine into “peace” on Russian terms. He has already lost the tariff war to Xi, his threats of duties on Russian oil imports proved empty, and he does not want to appear feeble again next to Xi. But more and more it looks as though that is exactly how it will turn out. China has reacted cautiously but generally positively to the Alaska summit, because it unfolded in a way favourable to the Xi–Putin tandem.

The Shadow of the “Big Deal” over Alaska

The China factor forces Trump to go full throttle. He still dreams of “tearing Russia away from China”. Both America and Russia are dependent on Chinese rare earth elements (REEs) and products made from them. This dependency is felt above all by the Americans, who exhausted their (considerable) domestic deposits in the early 2000s. Russia has significant, though smaller than China’s, REE resources, many of them in the Arctic zone of the Republic of Sakha. Russia is unable to develop them, while the US has the necessary technology and plans for a project in Alaska. It is telling that the fundamental election blueprint of Trumpism, “Mandate for Leadership: Project 2025”, explicitly states:

“Systematically reduce and ultimately eliminate any US dependence on communist China supply chains that could be used to threaten national security, such as medicines, silicon chips, rare earth minerals, computer motherboards, flat panel displays, and military components.”

Trump’s “big deal” ideas are not only about joint development of Arctic oil and gas deposits, but above all REEs, and about ending dependence on China. The Kremlin is feeding Trump’s dreams. Back in February 2025, Putin declared readiness to work with American partners on developing REE deposits, noting that Russia’s resources were far greater than Ukraine’s. It is telling that in May 2025 Rosneft acquired a licence for a deposit, describing it as a “potential candidate” for cooperation with the US if an economic agreement is concluded. Just recently, Putin’s aide Yury Ushakov emphasised that the US and Russia are close neighbours across the Bering Strait and have shared economic interests in Alaska and the Arctic.

Attention should also be drawn to Putin’s decree of 15 August potentially allowing ExxonMobil to return to Sakhalin-1, the largest Russian oil and gas project involving Western capital. The decree, published on the very day of the Alaska summit, provides for the return of foreign investors — but only if they help lift Western sanctions, sign supply contracts for necessary equipment, and transfer funds to project accounts. ExxonMobil exited in 2022, losing $4.6 billion.

As I noted recently, the Kremlin’s well-timed blocking of American giants Chevron and ExxonMobil via Russian transit of Kazakh production provides Putin with leverage over the White House, regardless of who sits in the Oval Office.

Trump, meanwhile, is in no rush with sanctions, though it is noted that in case of failure the US is ready to strengthen measures against Rosneft, Lukoil, the “shadow fleet”, and impose new tariffs on buyers of Russian oil, similar to the current demonstrative slapping of India with tariffs (which may already have ended after Alaska). Trump’s threats of sanctions against everyone, combined with inaction, suit Putin only partially. Falling oil prices mean the Kremlin is running out of money for war as costs grow. Scraping the bottom of the barrel is not working well either.

Epstein’s Hand from the Other World

As always, one must look at Trump’s domestic problems. His flashy bombing raid on Iran did not succeed in diverting political and public attention from the Epstein case. On 4 September, both the Senate and the House resume work after the summer recess. Trump persuaded senators not to pass a bill on “hellish” sanctions against Russia, arguing that he would “handle Russia himself”, but his efforts produced no results. Both senators and congressmen will not only refuse to ignore Trump’s humiliation of the US before a war criminal, but will also continue to ask: what about the Epstein case? Midterm elections are a year away. Within the MAGA camp, discord and infighting grow because of this.

It is against this background that Trump is trying to secure a result — to resolve the “Ukrainian crisis”, which he believes will erase all his “sins” and, perhaps, even reward him with a Nobel. And most likely, Putin has made it clear to Trump that a “big deal” on REEs and in other spheres will not come without a peace deal.

In practice, Trump has adopted Putin’s vision of the “war in Ukraine”, namely that it is not Russian aggression but a “Ukrainian crisis” caused by “Western intrusion into historically Russian lands”, and that “Russia is merely reclaiming what is its own”. And Trump’s repeated claims, from the election campaign onwards, that the war in Ukraine is “Biden’s war”, confirm Putin’s thesis about the “root causes” of the war. Putin flattered Trump in KGB style, saying that the war in Ukraine would never have begun if Trump had been president of the United States.

Lukashenko’s Move

Trump’s sudden call to the self-proclaimed head of Belarus, Alyaksandr Lukashenko, is unlikely to have been improvisation. It was probably a pre-arranged scenario. Recall General Kellogg’s visit to Minsk — it was simply kept secret.

Trump’s stick is the warning to Lukashenko against any moves by forces involved in the “Zapad-2025” exercises from Belarusian territory, particularly towards the Baltic States or Poland, against talk about “Oreshniki” and missile-nuclear topics, and against excessive Beijing influence in Minsk.

The carrot for Lukashenko may be a softening of sanctions and possibly restoring Minsk’s status as a venue for “Ukrainian crisis” negotiations, as well as a possible meeting place for Trump and Putin if needed.

This would suit Putin as well. Before a “next time in Moscow”, Putin needs the “client”, i.e. Trump, to “ripen”. And he wants to show Trump that Belarus for Russia is analogous to Alaska for the US, and to hint that Ukraine is like California or Texas, which would have its “thousand miles of ocean” if it were part of Russia.

Foiling the Criminals’ Plans

It is becoming increasingly clear that Putin played along and created in Trump the illusion of readiness for a “big deal” — not only about REEs or oil and gas, but above all about Ukraine. For the American president, Ukraine has no value in itself; rather, it is a source of his problems and failures. Why not trade “real estate” if there is a buyer? Some barter may be possible.

But this bargain will not be honest. Putin does not intend to “break away” from China — that would be catastrophic for him. He wants everything: Ukraine, intimidated by Trump’s threats to Zelenskyy, and at the same time to preserve relations with Beijing, manoeuvring in coordination with Xi. Trump understands that coordination will take place in the Putin–Xi format at the SCO summit in Tianjin, hence his rush before 31 August.

One must also note that American public opinion still strongly supports Ukraine and distrusts Russia and Putin. Trump may ignore this, but he does care what approval rating Republicans will have when they go into the 2026 midterms, where defeat would spell disaster for him. On the other hand, Zelenskyy cannot accept Trump’s proposals, which reflect all of Putin’s demands. Bankova — the Office of the President of Ukraine — has recently discovered that civil society in Ukraine has its own opinion and is ready to respond to government missteps. Zelenskyy, even if he wanted to, could not take steps towards Trump, as that would automatically trigger a domestic political crisis and upheaval. Ukraine’s position in Washington can and must therefore be tough.

It is clear that Trump crossed a moral line on 15 August by shaking hands with a war criminal. It is unlikely that the Nobel Committee, which operates under established procedure, can ignore this, since the award in question is the Peace Prize, not a scientific Nobel. It cannot be given to someone whose actions risk producing the opposite — war.

Let the nominations remain for another year. The moral authorities of Ukraine and Europe, including Ukrainian PEN and various international artistic and cultural associations, should appeal to the Nobel Committee demanding that Trump’s nomination not be considered, especially since the formal deadlines for this year have long passed.

Europe Must Change Its Approach to War

An old Latin maxim says: nullum magnum periculum sine periculo vincitur — no great danger is overcome without danger. Europe must act pre-emptively, not reactively. Not to defend Ukraine, but to safeguard its own future — not some abstract or distant one, but a very concrete future that will soon become the present, in the coming months or at most years. To prevent it turning into wartime disaster across the Baltic–Balkan zone, Europe must act in advance to preserve at least the status quo. Just as firefighters stop the spread of a forest fire by burning off areas in its path.

It is important that in Washington there will be a support group for Ukraine’s president among the leaders of Europe’s major states, including the “iron ladies” of Europe — Ursula von der Leyen and Giorgia Meloni. This is necessary. But Europe must go further in confronting Russian aggression, which, as the head of the Italian Institute of International Affairs, Nathalie Tocci, said at the Kyiv Security Forum, is “stimulated by American betrayal” — that is, specifically by Trump’s betrayal.

It is understandable that European politicians are horrified at the mere thought that Europe may have to enter the war. They argue: the war in Ukraine is the war in Ukraine. The course of the West in general, and Europe in particular, has always been to contain the war within Ukraine’s borders. But that was never the aggressor’s intention. The aggression is not only against Ukraine but also against Europe — only the tools differ: conventional against Ukraine, hybrid (for now) against Europe. In fact, nothing prevents a European state or group of states from sending a couple of squadrons to defend Ukraine’s airspace over the Right Bank (of Dnipro river), at least as a humanitarian mission.

Europeans must test their armed forces. NATO standards, training centres and ranges are not enough to assess the combat capability and readiness of those forces still called the armies of European countries. Western militaries, especially the Americans, were defeated by poorly armed militant groups in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Those groups had no aircraft, no missiles, no satellites, yet they defeated the US in a 20-year war of attrition. The Yankees eventually fled Afghanistan in disgrace. Incidentally, the road to that Afghan disgrace was paved by Trump himself with his “peace deal”, the Doha Agreement of 29 February 2020.

The Czech Republic’s Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský gave a vivid and precise reaction to Trump’s Alaskan antics:

“The problem is Russian imperialism, not Ukraine’s desire to live freely. And let us not forget that behind these words lies also Putin’s desire to roll back the security architecture to 1997, when the Czech Republic was not yet part of NATO. Our existential interest is to prevent such scenarios.”