Italian investigative outlet Linkiesta has reported that Russian-origin small arms and ammunition have been moved covertly into Italy through mafia structures, with consignments routed by sea and overland and then warehoused by clans for resale or contingency use.

The report, published on 18 September, cites unmarked Kalashnikov-pattern rifles, newer assault and sniper systems, and ammunition manufactured between 2010 and 2020. It identifies Sicilian ports—including the Catania area—and border crossings in Friuli Venezia Giulia as key entry points.

According to Linkiesta’s account, consignments are channelled through Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”—older tankers and cargo vessels operating under flags of convenience to move sanctioned commodities—before being broken down and concealed in barrels of oil, fuel or lubricants to avoid inspections and preserve the weapons from corrosion. The story states that suspect calls have been logged at secondary Sicilian ports and that onward distribution mirrors established narcotics routes.

The “shadow fleet” has been the focus of successive European and UK sanctions packages in 2024–2025 aimed at disrupting the carriage of Russian oil outside the G7 price cap regime. Analysts have assessed that the fleet’s growth has complicated maritime oversight and created opportunities for ancillary illicit movements. In May this year, the EU and UK expanded designations against vessels, owners and facilitators linked to such operations; independent analysis has warned that the expanding fleet poses broader compliance and security risks.

The Linkiesta article places particular emphasis on Catania. It notes that weapons caches tied to the Santapaola-Ercolano clan’s Nizza group were seized by police in March 2022, shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At that time, law enforcement recovered nine firearms—including two AK-47s described as Soviet-made—and almost 900 rounds. Linkiesta adds that fresh consignments are reported to be circulating in the San Giovanni Galermo and Librino districts and stored in prepared warehouses. Earlier seizures in the Catania area, including a 2020 discovery of rifles, pistols and a machine gun hidden in underground tanks near the seafront, illustrate the long-standing practice of concealed storage sites around the city.

The report also describes an east-to-west land corridor through Friuli Venezia Giulia. Border police have historically intercepted ex-Yugoslav and former Soviet weapons concealed in vehicles in the Gorizia–Trieste area; research cited by Linkiesta points to the region as a favoured entry point for small consignments hidden in false compartments, with distribution into organised-crime markets.

On the criminal-economy side, Linkiesta says part of the arsenal is “on demand” stock, while some is retained in “controlled storage” as a strategic reserve. Europol’s assessments over the past decade describe how Italian mafia groups use compartmented stockpiles and diversified logistics to support broader portfolios of crime, with firearms trafficking embedded alongside narcotics, extortion and money laundering. Europol further notes that Italian mafia-style networks operate across more than 45 countries, maintaining supply chains that can be repurposed for weapons.

The outlet’s sources attribute at least some of the small arms to the state-owned Tula arms plant, asserting that certain items have been despatched without serial numbers. Linkiesta references European and UN analyses warning that “new” weapons lacking defaced serials—i.e., produced without markings—indicate potential para-state complicity, and that diversion risks arising from the war in Ukraine extend to European criminal markets, with southern EU states considered exposed. While independent monitors last year reported limited verified spillover of Ukrainian-sourced arms into the EU at scale, both EU and global research bodies continue to flag the risk of future diversion.

Italian police and anti-mafia bodies have remained active against the Catania clans in recent years. Operations in 2024–2025 targeted the Santapaola-Ercolano organisation’s assets and personnel, including a 100-million-euro confiscation by the Anti-Mafia Investigation Directorate (DIA) and a July 2025 multi-province action that produced 38 arrest warrants and seizures including war-type weapons and narcotics. These proceedings are separate from the Linkiesta claims but illustrate sustained law-enforcement pressure on the same criminal ecosystem said to be handling the arms.

The Linkiesta report’s core allegations—maritime insertion using sanction-evading vessels, concealment within petroleum cargo, and structured warehousing by mafia clans—align with known techniques in illicit-trade logistics. However, independent confirmation of specific consignments, routes and serial-number status has not been published by Italian authorities. As with prior episodes of clandestine arms flows into Italy, the public record primarily consists of discrete seizures and judicial actions, with intelligence-led elements remaining confidential.

Policy attention is likely to focus on three areas. First, maritime enforcement: ongoing EU/UK sanctions against the “shadow fleet” intersect with Italian port-state control and may warrant targeted inspections of ancillary cargo aboard sanctioned or high-risk vessels. Second, inland border controls: the Gorizia–Trieste corridor remains a persistent risk vector for small-lot trafficking, suggesting continued use of mobile checks and cooperation with Balkan counterparts. Third, financial disruption: investigations into mafia asset bases, shell companies and logistics providers offer a means to degrade storage and resale capacity even where evidentiary thresholds on arms consignments are challenging.