BERLIN — Germany has begun exploring, with European partners, whether a shared nuclear deterrence arrangement could complement the United States’ longstanding role as the ultimate guarantor of European security, Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on Thursday.

Speaking in Berlin after a foreign policy statement in the Bundestag, Merz framed the idea as an initial, exploratory discussion rather than a near-term policy shift. “These talks are taking place,” he said, adding that the timing was not yet right for decisions.

His remarks land amid renewed debate in Germany about strategic dependence on Washington, driven by a sharper tone from the Trump administration towards allies and a broader European effort to increase defence spending and readiness. In recent weeks, President Donald Trump has again questioned burden-sharing within NATO and raised alarm among allies with remarks and threats touching on tariffs and Greenland, before rowing back on some points.

Merz sought to draw a boundary between debate and action. Germany, he said, was not moving to acquire nuclear weapons, and its treaty commitments remained binding. Germany’s post-reunification settlement — commonly referred to as the Two Plus Four Treaty — reaffirmed the country’s renunciation of “manufacture and possession of and control over nuclear, biological and chemical weapons”, and linked that position explicitly to continued obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

At the same time, Merz argued that legal constraints do not prevent Berlin from discussing “joint solutions” with allies — particularly Britain and France, Europe’s only nuclear-armed states. He also insisted that any European discussion would not automatically conflict with existing NATO arrangements involving US weapons.

Germany already sits within NATO’s nuclear deterrence architecture through “nuclear sharing”, under which a small number of US B61 gravity bombs are widely assessed to be stored at Büchel air base, with German aircraft assigned to the mission in the event of NATO authorisation. NATO describes its nuclear forces as a core part of deterrence, aimed at preserving peace and deterring coercion and aggression, and has long treated the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe as both a military capability and a political signal of alliance cohesion.

Merz’s comments were echoed by Thomas Röwekamp, the head of the Bundestag’s defence committee, who argued that Germany has relevant industrial and technological capacity even though it has neither nuclear warheads nor dedicated delivery systems of its own. Speaking to Welt TV, Röwekamp said Germany could contribute to a joint European initiative, while acknowledging the absence of missiles or warheads in German hands.

What a “shared nuclear umbrella” would mean in practice remains unclear — and is politically sensitive. The two European nuclear powers maintain nationally controlled forces with distinct doctrines and command chains. France’s nuclear deterrent is generally assessed to comprise roughly 290 warheads, centred on submarine-launched ballistic missiles and an air-launched component. The United Kingdom’s deterrent is based on Trident submarines, with official policy since 2021 allowing a stockpile cap of “no more than 260” warheads, while London has reduced public transparency about exact totals and timelines.

For Germany, the debate cuts across law, alliance management and domestic politics. Any step beyond discussion would raise questions about decision-making authority, the relationship with NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, and the boundary between deterrence cooperation and prohibited “control” under longstanding non-proliferation rules. The practical mechanics — basing, readiness, consultation procedures, targeting policy, and financial burden-sharing — would be contentious even before legal hurdles are tested.

Merz presented the idea as one strand of a broader European response to a more uncertain security environment. In his Bundestag address, he called for a stronger European role within NATO while maintaining ties with the United States, rejecting the notion that Europe should accept a subordinate position in transatlantic relations.

No timetable has been set for talks, and Merz stressed that no decision was imminent. But the public acknowledgement of discussions — and the explicit reference to Britain and France — signals how far the debate has moved from abstract commentary into the language of government, at a time when Europe is re-examining the assumptions that have underpinned its security since the Cold War.