The United States has privately told European NATO allies that it expects them to assume the bulk of the Alliance’s conventional defence in Europe by 2027 and is prepared to step back from key planning roles if that does not happen, according to the officials briefed on recent high-level discussions in Washington.

At a meeting in Washington this week between Pentagon officials responsible for NATO policy and several European delegations, US officials said Europe should take over most non-nuclear capabilities – from ground forces and air defence to intelligence and missiles – within two years. Several European officials present described the deadline as “tight” and in some cases “unrealistic”, given current industrial and capability gaps.

From burden-sharing to an ultimatum

According to accounts given to Reuters, the message marked a sharper turn in a long-running US demand that Europe shoulder more of the continent’s defence. Senior Pentagon officials reportedly underlined that the Indo-Pacific is now the administration’s priority theatre and that the United States “cannot fight two wars at once”, framing the transfer of NATO’s conventional burden to Europe as non-negotiable.

European diplomats were told that by 2027 NATO’s internal structures should reflect a Europe-led conventional posture. If that transition is not achieved, the United States may withdraw from some of the Alliance’s core coordination mechanisms, including the NATO Force Model (NFM) and the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), which underpin long-term force generation and capability planning.

US officials emphasised that, for now, Washington will continue to participate fully in these mechanisms, but largely in order to manage a “smooth handover” of responsibilities to European officers. After 2027, one official told Kyiv Post, Europe would need to “figure it out” without assuming automatic US participation.

While no immediate large-scale changes to US troop deployments in Europe are envisaged, Washington intends to reduce the number of senior American officers in NATO’s command structure, opening more posts to European commanders. The post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), held by a US general, is expected to remain unchanged.

Unclear status inside Washington

The Pentagon’s message comes against the backdrop of a new US National Security Strategy that questions Europe’s trajectory and warns of “civilisational erasure”, language that has drawn strong criticism from former European leaders. However, even within Washington there appears to be uncertainty over how far the 2027 deadline reflects a settled presidential position rather than the view of defence officials. Reuters reports “significant disagreements” in the US capital over what military role America should retain in Europe.

On Capitol Hill, some members of Congress have been briefed on the Pentagon’s signal to allies and have expressed concern about the consequences for NATO cohesion if Europe fails to reach the target in time.

European capabilities and industrial limits

European governments have already pledged sharp increases in defence spending. At the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, all allies agreed a new target of 5 per cent of GDP for defence and defence-related expenditure by 2035, with progress to be reviewed in 2029. In parallel, the EU’s “Readiness 2030” initiative seeks to mobilise up to €800 billion to strengthen Europe’s defence industrial base and reduce reliance on US capabilities.

Those plans are beginning to translate into production. EU schemes such as the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) aim to raise European output to around two million artillery shells a year by the end of 2025, while NATO now says the Alliance as a whole has overtaken Russia in ammunition production after years of lagging behind.

Nonetheless, officials acknowledge that some of the capabilities Washington expects Europe to assume – especially high-end intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and certain advanced missile and air-defence systems – cannot be replicated quickly. The Reuters account notes that the United States provides “unique” intelligence assets that have been critical to Ukraine’s defence and that many of the US-made systems Europe is trying to buy face significant production backlogs.

European specialists in defence planning therefore question whether a three-year horizon is sufficient to replace US capacity rather than merely rebalance it. Their concern is that a reduction in American coordination and enablers could lower NATO’s overall conventional strength in Europe during the transition period, even if European spending continues to rise.

Ukraine: support continues via NATO mechanisms

One element of continuity is Ukraine. Both US and European officials stress that military assistance to Kyiv will continue – and, in the near term, increase – even as NATO’s internal division of labour shifts.

A central channel is the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), a NATO mechanism under which European allies and partners finance US-made weapons for Ukraine. NATO describes PURL as a way to coordinate packages of equipment that the United States can supply at scale, including air defence systems and ammunition. Twenty-one countries have now joined the programme, with total commitments exceeding $4 billion.

According to the Kyiv Post report, US officials have explicitly linked the new 2027 posture to this ongoing support, arguing that keeping Ukraine well armed is central to European security as NATO restructures.

An end to “automatic” US first response

For many European diplomats, the message from Washington amounts less to a full US withdrawal than to the end of what one described as “the old NATO paradigm”, in which the United States is assumed to be the automatic first responder to any large-scale crisis on the continent.

In practical terms, the next few years will be defined by two hard tests: whether European states can rapidly convert higher defence spending and industrial plans into real, deployable capabilities, and whether the United States fixes the Pentagon’s 2027 deadline into binding policy. The speed with which Europe closes its capability gaps – and the firmness with which Washington sticks to its timetable – will decide whether a Europe-led conventional defence posture strengthens NATO’s deterrence, or weakens it, at a time when Russia’s war against Ukraine continues and its threat extends to the security of the whole of Europe.