Poland has moved the question of nuclear deterrence closer to the centre of the European security debate after Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that Warsaw wants “as much autonomy as possible” in this field and is holding talks with France and a group of European partners.

The remarks came a day after President Emmanuel Macron set out a revised French nuclear posture designed to involve selected European allies more closely in what Paris describes as an expanded deterrence framework.

Tusk said Poland was investing heavily in future nuclear power plants and did not intend to remain passive “when it comes to nuclear security in a military context”. He added that, as Polish capabilities increase, the government would try to prepare the country for more autonomous action while continuing to work with allies. He also said the issue would be discussed further in Paris during a March nuclear summit, including in talks with Macron and other European partners.

The Polish position reflects a broader shift in European strategic thinking. For decades, the continent’s ultimate security guarantee has rested overwhelmingly on NATO and, within NATO, on the United States. NATO’s own description of its nuclear posture states that deterrence in Europe relies on US nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe as well as allied aircraft, infrastructure and planning arrangements. At the same time, France and the United Kingdom maintain independent nuclear forces of their own.

What has changed is the political climate in which these arrangements are being discussed. Macron’s speech on 2 March presented what AP described as a new phase in French deterrence, with closer coordination involving eight countries: Britain, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Denmark. Under that approach, France would retain sole control over any decision to use nuclear weapons, but allies could take part in deterrence exercises and support operations through conventional assets such as missile warning, air defence and long-range strike capabilities. Macron said the doctrine could allow the temporary deployment of French nuclear-armed aircraft on allied territory.

For Poland, the attraction is clear. It sits on NATO’s eastern flank, borders the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus, and has become one of Europe’s most heavily armed states since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. A greater role in European nuclear planning, even without independent control of weapons, would deepen Poland’s place in the continent’s highest level of deterrence architecture. Tusk’s wording suggests that Warsaw is not merely seeking symbolic participation, but a larger strategic role tied to the wider European debate over defence integration and strategic autonomy.

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Yet the proposal also exposes the limits of European autonomy. Macron has made clear that French nuclear command will remain strictly national. The French president alone would decide on any use of force. That means European partners may gain consultation, planning links and operational coordination, but not shared authority. In practice, this is less a European nuclear force than a French deterrent more visibly connected to European defence.

The debate is also political inside Poland. President Karol Nawrocki’s foreign policy chief, Marcin Przydacz, said the president had not been informed of the talks with France and argued that Poland’s first priority should be discussions with the United States on joining NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. He questioned whether France had a sufficient arsenal to provide an effective umbrella and warned against any move that might weaken the American role in Europe. Opposition figures from Law and Justice made similar arguments.

That distinction matters. One line of argument holds that European states must build stronger capabilities of their own because the security environment has hardened and dependence on Washington carries risk. Another holds that any European initiative must remain firmly supplementary to NATO’s existing structures, not an alternative to them. Macron himself has said the French approach is intended to complement NATO’s nuclear mission rather than replace it.

For Brussels and other European capitals, Poland’s intervention sharpens an issue that can no longer be treated as theoretical. Defence integration has often focused on procurement, industrial capacity, readiness and funding. Poland’s remarks push the discussion into the most sensitive area of all: whether Europe can develop a more credible strategic deterrent role without undermining NATO cohesion, breaching national red lines, or creating new command ambiguities.

What is now under way is not the creation of a European nuclear force in the formal sense. It is, rather, the beginning of a more explicit attempt to anchor European defence in stronger European decision-making, planning and burden-sharing at a time of sustained pressure from Russia and growing concern about long-term American reliability. Poland’s demand for greater autonomy shows how far that debate has advanced.