


Turkey is preparing to use the NATO summit in Ankara not only as a demonstration of alliance relevance, but as leverage in its long-running disputes over combat aircraft, sanctions and access to European missile-defence cooperation.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is expected to raise defence-trade restrictions and Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 programme in talks with Donald Trump, while also advancing cooperation with France and Italy on the SAMP/T air-defence system, according to Reuters’ summit preview.
The agenda reflects a basic feature of Turkey’s NATO policy. Ankara remains strategically indispensable because of its geography, armed forces and defence industry, but its relationships with allies are repeatedly complicated by procurement decisions and an insistence on greater national autonomy.
Turkey was removed from the F-35 programme after taking delivery of Russia’s S-400 air-defence system. Washington argued that operating the Russian system alongside the F-35 would create an unacceptable risk to the aircraft’s sensitive technology and signatures.
The United States subsequently imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Turkey has maintained that it was forced towards the S-400 after failing to secure acceptable Western air-defence terms and has sought a route back into the fighter programme.
Ankara’s case is not only military. Turkish companies had been integrated into the F-35 supply chain, and removal carried industrial as well as capability costs. Turkey has since advanced its indigenous KAAN fighter programme and ordered additional F-16s, but the F-35 would still provide a step change in stealth, sensor fusion and coalition interoperability.
The central obstacle remains the S-400. Unless Washington accepts a verifiable arrangement that prevents its operational use or removes the system from Turkey, political interest in restoring F-35 access may not be enough.
Turkey has also pursued cooperation with France and Italy around SAMP/T, the European medium-to-long-range air-defence system developed by Eurosam through MBDA and Thales.
The appeal is clear. Cooperation could help Turkey strengthen layered air defence without deepening dependence on Russia, while giving European manufacturers a major market and a powerful industrial partner. It could also create a practical route for rebuilding trust after years of tension.
Defence Matters has examined the growing importance of SAMP/T after Denmark confirmed the system’s first export success. Turkish participation would be more politically complex because Ankara is seeking technology access and industrial cooperation, not simply an off-the-shelf purchase.
France and Italy will want guarantees on intellectual property, export control and alignment with NATO requirements. Turkey will resist an arrangement that leaves it dependent on foreign approval for core capability.
Ankara will also use the summit to promote a defence sector that has expanded rapidly in drones, missiles, armoured vehicles, naval systems and electronics. Turkish equipment is now widely exported, and its manufacturers increasingly seek partnerships inside Europe.
This industrial rise strengthens Erdoğan’s negotiating position. Allies that once viewed Turkey primarily as a customer must now treat it as a supplier and potential co-producer. At the same time, European governments remain cautious about technology transfer and about Turkish export relationships beyond NATO.
Calls to lift intra-alliance defence restrictions will therefore encounter different national concerns. Some limits are political responses to Turkish operations or foreign policy; others involve security reviews and licensing rules that governments are unlikely to abandon collectively.
Turkey’s role in the Alliance gives it undeniable weight. It controls the straits linking the Black Sea and Mediterranean, hosts important NATO infrastructure and fields one of the Alliance’s largest militaries. The summit allows Erdoğan to place Turkish priorities directly before allied leaders.
But hosting cannot erase the underlying disputes. F-35 access requires a solution to the S-400 problem. SAMP/T cooperation requires agreement on technology and industrial control. Broader trade restrictions depend on Turkey’s relationships with individual allies.
Ankara’s strategy is to connect these issues to NATO’s current need for higher production and a stronger European pillar. Turkey can credibly argue that excluding a large allied defence industry weakens the Alliance’s capacity. Its partners can equally argue that access to the most sensitive programmes depends on trust and compatible strategic choices.
The summit may not settle those arguments. It will show whether both sides are prepared to turn Turkey’s growing defence weight into deeper integration, or whether procurement disputes continue to limit one of NATO’s most important relationships.