


The VA has unquestionably lost jobs. The department says it reduced its total workforce by about 30,000 during fiscal 2025. For employees facing redundancy, retirement or the disappearance of a familiar role, the consequences are real and understandably painful. A government that asks its workforce to accept restructuring should not pretend otherwise.
But it does not follow that fewer employees necessarily means worse services for veterans. Indeed, some of the early evidence points in the opposite direction.
The striking feature of the Trump administration’s approach is that it has not treated the VA primarily as a spending problem. The department received $401bn in congressional appropriations in fiscal 2025, an increase of $66bn, or roughly 20 per cent, from the previous year. For fiscal 2027, the administration is requesting a further $488.2bn, 7.7 per cent above the fiscal 2026 enacted level.
That is hardly the profile of an administration attempting to abandon America’s veterans.
Rather, the argument is that a large organisation can spend more while employing fewer people if it removes duplication, modernises technology and directs a greater proportion of its resources towards the people it exists to serve.
There are few more obvious candidates for such treatment than the VA. It is a vast organisation, operating hospitals, clinics, benefits programmes, cemeteries, digital systems and an increasingly important network of private-sector healthcare providers. Scale brings resources, but it can also bring inertia.
The administration’s most persuasive case therefore rests not on the number of jobs eliminated but on what happens afterwards.
The early evidence on veterans’ benefits is remarkably positive. The VA processed more than 3mn disability claims during fiscal 2025, a record. By June 1 2026, it had already processed more than 2mn claims in the new fiscal year. The average time required to decide a claim had fallen to 78.6 days at the end of May, from 141.5 days on January 20 2025.
In July, the department reported that the disability compensation and pension backlog had fallen below 70,000 claims for the first time since February 2020. The average processing time had fallen further, to 77.7 days.
These are not cosmetic improvements. For a veteran waiting for compensation following an injury or illness incurred during military service, the difference between five months and ten weeks is tangible. Government efficiency becomes meaningful when it changes the experience of the citizen at the other end of the process.
There are similar signs in healthcare. The VA says it completed more than 82mn direct-care appointments in fiscal 2025, an increase of 4.1 per cent on the previous year, while opening 36 new healthcare facilities since January 2025. It also provided more than 2.8mn appointments outside normal operating hours.
Technology is becoming an important part of that equation. The department has introduced systems designed to accelerate community-care appointments, allowing staff to see participating providers’ scheduling systems and book appointments more efficiently. It is also using artificial intelligence to process documentation associated with treatment delivered outside the VA.
Perhaps the most revealing reforms are the least glamorous. In June, the VA completed the consolidation of payroll processing for more than 430,000 employees. Previously, 114 medical centres maintained their own payroll systems even though the department already had a central financial-services operation capable of performing the work. The consolidation was completed 15 months ahead of schedule.
None of this makes every staffing reduction wise. Healthcare is labour-intensive, and concerns about the loss of doctors, nurses, psychologists and social workers deserve serious scrutiny. The VA should not confuse administrative efficiency with indiscriminate headcount reduction. Nor should management assume that every vacant post is evidence of waste.
There is also a legitimate debate over the expansion of community care. Giving veterans access to private providers can be a valuable extension of choice, particularly where VA facilities cannot offer timely treatment. But the department must ensure that outsourcing complements rather than progressively hollows out its own clinical capacity.
That is the test the administration should now embrace: not whether the VA is smaller, but whether it is better.
Employees who lose their jobs have every reason to be angry. Public-sector workers are not abstractions in a spreadsheet; they have mortgages, families and professional commitments. A humane restructuring should provide transparency, fair procedures and, where possible, opportunities for redeployment.
Yet sympathy for displaced employees should not become an argument for preserving inefficient structures indefinitely. The VA’s first responsibility is to veterans, not to the preservation of every existing administrative arrangement.
The most encouraging aspect of the current reform programme is therefore the possibility of separating the size of the bureaucracy from the quality of the service.
America’s veterans do not need a department that is large for the sake of being large. They need one that answers the telephone, processes claims quickly, provides excellent healthcare, invests in modern facilities and uses technology intelligently.
If the Trump administration can reduce duplication while increasing access, accelerate benefits while maintaining accuracy and preserve frontline healthcare while eliminating administrative waste, then the restructuring will have achieved something considerably more valuable than a reduction in payroll.
It will have demonstrated that a government department can become smaller in some respects while becoming stronger in the one respect that ultimately matters: its ability to serve those to whom the nation owes a debt.
For the VA, that should be the only balance sheet that counts.