Europe’s largest missile maker says it will raise production by 40% in 2026, with Aster output set to double, as demand from Ukraine, the Middle East and NATO rearmament continues to strain Western stockpiles.

MBDA, Europe’s largest missile manufacturer, plans to increase overall production by 40% in 2026, marking another step in the continent’s effort to rebuild depleted weapons stocks and shorten delivery times for critical air-defence and strike systems. The company said missile production had already doubled between 2023 and the end of 2025, and that it would now intensify that expansion with higher investment and more hiring.

The clearest signal is on Aster. Reuters reported, and MBDA confirmed, that production of the Aster family is due to double in 2026. That matters because Aster 30 is one of Europe’s key air-defence interceptors, used in the Franco-Italian SAMP/T system and at sea by several European navies. In practical terms, a higher Aster production rate is not simply an industrial milestone. It goes directly to the question of how quickly European states can replace missiles transferred to Ukraine, rebuild national inventories and sustain prolonged demand in multiple theatres at once.

MBDA’s chief executive, Eric Béranger, said the company had already spent €1 billion on production stock without waiting for firm contracts, a sign that industry is trying to move away from the old just-in-time model and towards a more anticipatory footing. MBDA said it will now double its planned investment for 2026–2030 to €5 billion in Europe and hire 2,800 people in 2026.

That shift reflects a broader strategic problem. Western missile stockpiles have been under pressure for more than two years because of support for Ukraine, but the strain has widened as air-defence demand has grown in the Middle East and as NATO allies seek to strengthen homeland protection against drones, cruise missiles and ballistic threats. Iran conflict has added further pressure to already stretched inventories, while a senior French military official warned publicly of shortages affecting both Aster 30 and Patriot stockpiles.

For Europe, the significance is not limited to one manufacturer. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said in the alliance’s annual report launch on 26 March that European allies and Canada increased defence spending by 20% in 2025 compared with the previous year, with all allies meeting the 2% of GDP benchmark for the first time and some moving well beyond it. That spending growth creates the financial basis for more procurement, but money alone does not solve the production bottleneck. The harder question is whether industry can convert demand into delivered capability quickly enough.

MBDA’s figures suggest some movement in that direction. According to the company, annual Mistral output has been multiplied by four since 2023, and the broader production ramp-up is accompanied by a substantial rise in orders. That points to a defence market that is no longer responding to a temporary spike, but to a structural change in European requirements. Governments are not only replacing donated munitions. They are trying to restore depth to inventories after decades in which many forces held limited stocks on the assumption that major state-on-state war in Europe was improbable.

This is why the story belongs in a readiness frame rather than a business one. Missile availability affects the credibility of integrated air and missile defence, the staying power of naval task groups, and the deterrent value of ground-based systems deployed on NATO’s eastern flank. If procurement cycles remain slow and output remains below operational need, Europe’s nominal rearmament will continue to outpace its usable inventories.

There is also a European industrial-policy angle. MBDA is owned by Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo, and its expansion sits within a wider push to strengthen the continent’s defence manufacturing base on European soil. The company said 70% of its order intake is European. In policy terms, that reinforces the argument in Brussels and among several member states that European rearmament must be tied not only to larger budgets, but also to stronger domestic production capacity and more predictable long-term contracts.

The main conclusion is straightforward. Europe is spending more, ordering more and speaking more openly about deterrence. But the decisive test remains output. MBDA’s planned 40% increase is substantial, and it is one of the clearest current indicators that the missile sector is moving onto a more sustained wartime footing. It is also a reminder that Europe’s defence problem is no longer principally about recognising the threat. It is about industrial tempo, stockpile depth and whether capability can be generated at the speed the security environment now requires.