Open-source analysis following Russia’s latest mass strike on Ukraine has raised the possibility that more than one Oreshnik missile was launched, with one apparently failing to reach its intended target. The claim remains unconfirmed by Ukraine’s Air Force, but the available evidence has intensified scrutiny of Russia’s newest long-range strike system.

Russia’s latest mass attack on Kyiv and other Ukrainian regions has opened a new line of scrutiny over the performance of Moscow’s Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile, after open-source analysts suggested that the strike may have involved not one launch, but two.

The attack overnight on May 24 was one of the heaviest bombardments of Kyiv since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Ukraine’s Air Force said Russia launched 90 missiles and 600 drones, while Ukrainian officials reported four deaths and almost 100 wounded across the country. Kyiv, the surrounding region and several other areas were hit, with damage reported to residential buildings, schools, cultural sites and infrastructure. Russia confirmed that Oreshnik, Iskander, Kinzhal and Zircon missiles had been used in the attack, according to Reuters reporting on the strike and Ukrainian coverage of the overnight bombardment.

The confirmed Oreshnik strike hit the Bila Tserkva area, south of Kyiv. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the missile struck Bila Tserkva, while reporting from Ukraine indicated that the warhead appeared to separate into multiple elements during flight. The Kyiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office said the attack damaged a garage cooperative and commercial buildings in the Bila Tserkva district, a result that stood in contrast to Moscow’s presentation of Oreshnik as a high-precision strategic system.

The more contentious issue is whether a second Oreshnik was launched and failed to reach its intended target. The argument rests largely on video footage circulated by monitoring and open-source channels, showing falling objects north or north-west of occupied Donetsk. Analysts cited by The New Voice of Ukraine said the objects resembled the descent pattern of separated Oreshnik warhead elements.

One OSINT assessment noted that the unfinished Rose Park shopping centre in Donetsk was visible in the footage, helping to establish the camera’s orientation towards areas including Avdiivka, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. However, the same analysis also acknowledged that it was not possible to determine the precise impact point. That caveat is important: the available material supports a serious question, but does not amount to definitive proof.

The theory advanced by some analysts is that a first Oreshnik either malfunctioned or fell short in the area around Avdiivka, after which Russia launched another missile that reached the Bila Tserkva district. This would explain why Ukraine’s Air Force officially confirmed only one Oreshnik strike on Ukrainian-controlled territory. Yuriy Ihnat, head of communications for Ukraine’s Air Force, said there was no official information about a second launch, according to the same Ukrainian report on the Oreshnik claims.

A second point cited by proponents of the theory is the wording of the Russian Defence Ministry’s own statement. In its account of the strike, Moscow referred to Oreshnik ballistic missiles in the plural. Russian military commentators also noted the formulation, arguing that it implied more than one missile was used. The wording is not conclusive proof of a failed launch, but it has added weight to the open-source discussion.

If the second-launch theory is correct, it would raise questions about the practical military value of Oreshnik as a precision strike weapon. The confirmed strike did not hit Kyiv itself but Bila Tserkva, roughly 60 to 70 kilometres from the capital. The reported damage to garages and commercial buildings contrasts sharply with Moscow’s public presentation of the missile as a new strategic instrument.

The episode also fits a broader pattern in which Russia has used high-profile weapons partly for signalling purposes. Oreshnik is nuclear-capable and has been presented by Moscow as a weapon designed to deter Western support for Ukraine. European governments described its latest use as an escalation, while EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas characterised it as nuclear brinkmanship, according to international coverage of the attack.

The military question, however, is separate from the political signal. A missile may be useful for intimidation while still showing shortcomings in accuracy, guidance or reliability. Ukrainian and open-source assessments have previously pointed to changing Russian missile components, including evidence that some systems have been fitted with lower-quality or less advanced electronics as sanctions and wartime production pressures affect supply chains. If similar constraints are affecting Oreshnik guidance systems, that would help explain why a weapon designed for long-range precision could produce limited or inaccurate results.

For Ukraine and its partners, the significance is twofold. First, Oreshnik remains a serious threat because of its speed, range and multiple-warhead design. Second, its battlefield performance may not match the image promoted by the Kremlin. The available evidence does not yet prove that a second missile fell near Avdiivka, but the possibility is credible enough to merit further examination.

The May 24 strike therefore leaves two conclusions. Russia is prepared to use increasingly escalatory missile systems against Ukrainian cities. At the same time, the emerging evidence suggests that even Moscow’s most politically advertised weapons may be affected by the same problems that have marked parts of Russia’s wartime arsenal: pressure on production, imperfect guidance and a gap between strategic messaging and battlefield effect.