Confidential presentations reportedly show Chinese and Russian specialists discussing a campaign against SpaceX’s satellite network, beginning with regulatory pressure and electronic interference before escalating to cyber attacks and the physical destruction of satellites.

Russia and China have held confidential discussions on restricting, disabling and potentially destroying SpaceX’s Starlink satellite network, according to a joint investigation based on leaked military documents.

The material includes four presentations delivered in November 2023 at the Third China-Russia Military-Technical Cooperation Forum in Guangzhou, along with a signed protocol from bilateral negotiations held in Moscow in June that year.

The annual forums, which reportedly began in 2020, brought together senior military officers, government officials and executives from defence companies. Participants were instructed not to speak to the press or disclose information about the meetings, while organisers sought to prevent event materials from leaving the venue. The next gathering was reportedly planned for St Petersburg in 2026.

The documents cover several areas of military co-operation, including anti-satellite weapons, integrated air and missile defence, autonomous loitering munitions, armoured vehicles and military aviation.

One presentation was devoted specifically to countering Starlink. It was prepared by Huang Hui and Ren Jie, researchers from the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, China’s main state-owned space contractor and an important supplier of military satellite and missile technology.

The presentation set out a three-level approach intended to contain the expansion of Starlink and, if necessary, neutralise the system.

Regulatory pressure and orbital competition

The first stage involved legal and diplomatic measures rather than weapons. The authors proposed emphasising the risks created by the growing number of satellites in low-Earth orbit, including congestion and possible collisions, to justify international restrictions on Starlink’s expansion.

Concerns about congestion are not invented: governments and commercial operators are competing for finite frequency bands and usable orbital capacity. However, the leaked presentation reportedly treated international regulation not only as a safety mechanism but as a means of obstructing a strategic competitor.

The second stage involved filing co-ordinated Russian and Chinese applications for radio frequencies and orbital positions. By reserving resources required for future satellite deployments, the two countries could make it more difficult for SpaceX to expand its constellation.

The same stage included a proposal for a joint electromagnetic-warfare architecture capable of selectively disrupting Starlink signals in particular geographical areas. The system would combine Russian and Chinese anti-satellite and electronic-warfare programmes under shared technical standards.

Cyber attacks and physical destruction

The third stage proposed direct attacks on the network.

The documents described cyber operations targeting Starlink’s customer terminals, including access spoofing, malware and the exploitation of technical vulnerabilities. The purpose would be to spread malicious software through user equipment and disrupt the wider network.

The presentation then considered the physical destruction of satellites. Because Starlink’s resilience is based partly on the size of its constellation, destroying several individual spacecraft would probably have only a limited effect. An effective anti-Starlink weapon would therefore need to disable large numbers of satellites at a cost below that of replacing them.

The reported objective was to develop an inexpensive “one against many” capability that could destroy satellites faster than SpaceX could launch replacements.

The documents do not establish that Russia or China has already developed or deployed such a system. They demonstrate that the idea was presented within a structured bilateral military forum, but the stage reached by any associated research programme remains unknown.

Any large-scale kinetic attack would also carry risks for the attacker. Destroying numerous satellites could produce clouds of debris capable of damaging Russian, Chinese and neutral spacecraft operating in the same orbital region.

Russian battlefield experience for Chinese technology

The wider co-operation described in the documents appears to involve an exchange between Russia’s operational experience and China’s technological and industrial capacity.

Russia can provide data from the war in Ukraine, including information about drone warfare, communications, electronic countermeasures and air-defence performance. China can offer electronics, artificial intelligence, manufacturing capacity and experience in large-scale industrial production.

At a December 2024 meeting in Yekaterinburg, Chinese participants reportedly sought information from Russian drone operations in Ukraine. In return, Chinese specialists proposed technological support for autonomous loitering munitions capable of operating in co-ordinated swarms.

The arrangement would allow Chinese institutions to study equipment and tactics under wartime conditions without China becoming a direct participant in the conflict. Russia, meanwhile, could obtain access to technologies and manufacturing methods that have become harder to secure under Western sanctions.

Why Starlink matters

Starlink began as a commercial broadband service but has become an important component of Ukraine’s military communications. Ukrainian troops use the network to maintain battlefield connectivity, operate drones, exchange reconnaissance data and coordinate artillery, logistics and medical evacuations.

More than 40,000 terminals were reported to be operating in Ukraine by late 2023. The system’s distributed satellite architecture allowed Ukrainian communications to continue despite Russian attacks on conventional telecommunications infrastructure.

The network has since become increasingly integrated into military command and control, with Starlink described as an essential element of Ukrainian battlefield communications.

Russian forces also obtained Starlink terminals through intermediaries and unofficial markets. In early 2026, SpaceX and the Ukrainian authorities introduced a registration system intended to restrict access to approved terminals and prevent Russian units from using the service in occupied territory.

The loss of access reportedly disrupted some Russian operations, underlining why Moscow has an interest in finding either an alternative network or an effective method of disabling Starlink.

Implications for Europe

The documents raise further questions about Beijing’s stated neutrality over Russia’s war against Ukraine. China says that its military relationship with Russia does not threaten third countries, but the leaked presentations indicate discussions about technologies with direct relevance to the Ukrainian battlefield.

German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul said the scale of Chinese support described by the investigation conflicted with Europe’s central security interests.

The files also expose Europe’s dependence on a private American company for secure satellite communications. The EU is developing the IRIS² constellation to provide sovereign communications for governments, armed forces and emergency services, but the European system is not expected to enter service before 2030.

The evidence does not show that an attack on Starlink is imminent. It does show that Russian and Chinese specialists have treated the network as a strategic military target and considered a range of measures against it — from international regulation and competition for frequencies to jamming, cyber operations and physical destruction.

The war over communications and battlefield data is no longer confined to infrastructure on the ground. It now extends hundreds of kilometres above the Earth, where commercial satellite networks have become part of modern military power.