A Washington-based think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), says the pace of Russia’s ground advance in Ukraine has fallen to levels that are historically low when set against major combined-arms offensives over the past century.

In a January 2026 brief, CSIS compares average daily rates of advance in selected operations from the First World War to the present conflict, using “metres per day” as a simple indicator of how quickly an attacker is able to translate combat power into territorial gain. The results place several current Russian offensives at the bottom end of the historical range.

Metres per day on the eastern front

CSIS’s table of “rates of advance” lists three Russian offensives in Ukraine with average movement measured in tens of metres per day. For the period from 27 February 2024 to 5 January 2026, CSIS calculates an average advance of 15 metres per day in the Chasiv Yar direction, 23 metres per day around Kupiansk, and 70 metres per day in the Pokrovsk sector.

These figures are presented as averages over long windows that cover multiple phases of fighting, rather than as a daily tactical log. Even so, they illustrate the degree to which positional warfare, fortifications, and attrition have limited Russia’s ability to achieve rapid operational breakthroughs along the line of contact.

CSIS also includes a fourth Russian operation, Huliaipole, dated from 5 November 2025 to 5 January 2026, with an average of 297 metres per day. While higher than the other three, it remains far below the movement rates recorded in several historical offensives used as benchmarks in the same CSIS comparison.

A First World War benchmark

To place the Ukraine war in a longer perspective, CSIS compares the current Russian figures with a selection of twentieth-century offensives, including some associated with the heavy losses and entrenched positions of the First World War.

The CSIS table gives the Battle of the Somme (1 July–19 November 1916) an average advance of 80 metres per day, under “fortified” defensive conditions. In CSIS’s framing, this means the Russian advance towards Pokrovsk, at 70 metres per day, is slower than the Somme benchmark, while the Chasiv Yar and Kupiansk rates are lower still.

Ukrainian counteroffensives in the same dataset

CSIS’s comparison does not only cover Russian operations. It also includes Ukrainian offensives in 2022 and 2023, which, in CSIS’s presentation, show substantially higher movement rates during periods when Ukrainian forces achieved surprise, exploited weaknesses in Russian deployments, or pushed against lines that were less prepared.

For Kherson (29 August–11 November 2022), CSIS lists an average of 590 metres per day. For the Kharkiv counteroffensive (6–13 September 2022), it lists 7,400 metres per day. In the table, Kharkiv is the highest daily rate among the selected operations spanning 1914–2026.

CSIS also includes Robotyne (4 June–28 August 2023) at 90 metres per day, reflecting the slower tempo Ukraine faced when attacking against layered fortifications and minefields.

What CSIS says the numbers imply

The CSIS brief argues that slow rates of advance help explain why the war has remained protracted despite Russia’s sustained offensive activity since 2024. It notes that Russia’s territorial gains have been “modest” relative to the time and resources expended, citing an estimate that Russian forces seized about 3,604 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory in 2024—around 0.6 per cent of Ukraine, by CSIS’s calculation.

The brief further links limited movement to the density of defensive works and the attritional character of combat, with both sides operating along a long front where artillery, drones, mines, trenches, and dispersed infantry positions constrain manoeuvre.

How the figures are being reported

The CSIS comparison has been widely picked up in regional coverage, often highlighting the 15–70 metres-per-day range for Russia’s key efforts and the contrast with Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Kherson operations.

For policymakers and military analysts, the headline metric is not a prediction of the war’s outcome, but a quantified description of the problem facing any force attempting to take ground against prepared defences. In CSIS’s framing, the Ukraine battlefield has turned movement into a costly commodity—measured, in some sectors, in metres.