Moscow is increasing pressure on NATO’s eastern flank through nuclear signalling, drone allegations and exercises with Belarus, but an imminent Russian attack on the Baltic states is not yet supported by the kind of military indicators seen before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Speculation over a possible Russian attack on a NATO member state has intensified as Moscow conducts nuclear exercises, issues warnings to the West and accuses Baltic countries of facilitating Ukrainian drone operations. The concern is not theoretical. Russia’s war against Ukraine has already demonstrated the Kremlin’s willingness to use large-scale force in Europe, while several Western intelligence assessments have warned that Moscow could test NATO once the war in Ukraine allows it to regenerate forces.

The immediate question, however, is whether Russia is preparing such a move now. On that point, the evidence remains less conclusive.

Russia and Belarus have held large-scale nuclear drills involving land, sea and air components, with Russia also moving nuclear munitions to field storage points in Belarus as part of the exercises. The drills involved missile systems, aircraft, warships and submarines, according to reporting on the Russian and Belarusian announcements about the delivery of nuclear munitions to Belarus.

Russia Says Nuclear Munitions Delivered to Storage Sites in Belarus During Drills

The exercises were accompanied by familiar Kremlin messaging. Russian officials have framed the drills as defensive and linked them to perceived threats from NATO and Ukraine. At the same time, a senior Russian diplomat warned that the risk of a direct Russia-NATO clash was increasing, while Moscow rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s warning that Belarus could be used as a launchpad for future operations against NATO territory.

This creates a volatile information environment. The Baltic states are particularly exposed to Russian pressure because of their geography, their NATO membership, and their proximity to Kaliningrad, Belarus and Russia’s western military districts. Scenarios often discussed by analysts include a move against the Suwałki corridor, a limited operation around Narva in eastern Estonia, or attempts to provoke unrest in Latvia’s eastern regions.

Yet the military logic of such an operation remains highly problematic for Moscow while the war in Ukraine continues. Russia’s most capable ground forces remain heavily committed in Ukraine. Opening another front against a NATO state would require not only available forces, but also command structures, logistics, air defence, reserves, and political willingness to risk a direct conflict with the Alliance.

A limited operation would also carry major uncertainty for Russia. Baltic forces are small compared with Russia’s overall military, but they are not defenceless. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have expanded defence planning since 2022, and NATO has reinforced its eastern flank. The United Kingdom, Germany, Canada and other allies have specific responsibilities in the region, while the United Kingdom-led Joint Expeditionary Force brings together ten northern European countries, including the Baltic states and Nordic members, as a high-readiness framework for regional crisis response.

For Russia, the escalation risks would be immediate. A large-scale attack would trigger NATO’s Article 5 deliberations and almost certainly draw in Poland, Germany, Britain and the Nordic allies. Even a smaller incursion designed to test Alliance cohesion would risk attacks on Russian military assets in Kaliningrad and around the Baltic Sea. Kaliningrad hosts significant Russian military infrastructure and parts of the Baltic Fleet, making it a vulnerable asset as well as a forward position.

The Kremlin may calculate that political uncertainty in Washington gives it an opening. Debate over America’s long-term role in NATO has sharpened under President Donald Trump, and European governments are increasingly discussing how to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. Former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has warned that NATO cannot survive without the United States, while reports of European contingency planning reflect growing concern over future American reliability.

However, uncertainty is not the same as paralysis. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has continued to press allies to increase defence spending and support for Ukraine, while warning that Russia must not assume escalation would go unanswered. During recent remarks Rutte again underlined the need for NATO to maintain credible deterrence in the face of Russia’s continued military pressure.

The most important distinction is between long-term risk and immediate preparation. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there were visible indicators: troop concentrations, equipment movements, field hospitals, logistical build-up, and public warnings by Western governments. At present, there is no comparable open-source evidence of a major Russian ground-force concentration near Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, nor of a large Russian deployment into Belarus for such an operation.

That does not remove the threat. Russia may continue to use drones, sabotage, disinformation, nuclear rhetoric and exercises to test NATO’s reactions and create political pressure. It may also see future opportunities if the war in Ukraine ends in a way that leaves Moscow with a large number of mobilised personnel and unresolved domestic pressures.

For now, however, the more likely scenario is coercive pressure rather than an imminent conventional attack. NATO’s task is to treat the risk seriously without amplifying unsupported claims. Deterrence depends not only on warning about Russia’s intentions, but also on maintaining a clear view of Russia’s actual capabilities, deployments and constraints.