For much of the post-Cold War era, Germany’s security narrative has been one of reassurance and restraint.

The Bundeswehr was kept deliberately modest; public sentiment was wary of military engagement, and political leaders stressed diplomacy over deterrence. Yet a profound shift has taken place in German public consciousness. According to a recent survey cited in a report by the Munich Security Conference, a majority of Germans now view Europe’s security environment as more dangerous than at any point even during the Cold War — and yet many remain deeply uncomfortable with the idea of military force being used to defend it.

The findings make sobering reading for policymakers in Berlin and Brussels. In a country scarred by two devastating world wars and long committed to pacifist instincts ingrained into its postwar identity, this new apprehension reflects both the lingering trauma of Russian aggression in Ukraine and a palpable unease about the solidity of transatlantic guarantees. The survey found that 53 per cent of Germans now see the continent’s security as less stable than it was in the bipolar confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact — a stark reversal from just half a decade ago, when 65 per cent felt secure.

Equally striking is the degree of scepticism about the role of the United States. Only 6 per cent of those polled expressed certainty that Washington would come to Europe’s defence in the event of a crisis, while 31 per cent deemed such support merely “somewhat likely”. In an alliance founded on the principle of collective defence — enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty — such doubts cut to the heart of NATO’s credibility.

Yet this heightened anxiety about security is accompanied by a profound ambivalence about the use of military force. When asked whether military power was increasing in importance, 64 per cent of respondents agreed. But this did not translate into a willingness to deploy that power. In fact, 63 per cent said that military force is never justified — a sentiment far more prevalent in Germany than in the United States, where only 29 per cent of those polled took the same view.

That discrepancy highlights a dilemma at the core of Germany’s role in NATO. Berlin has accelerated its defence spending and taken steps to bolster NATO’s eastern flank in recent years, reflecting a strategic realignment following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Bundeswehr has been modernised, new capabilities acquired, and German forces deployed in the Baltic states in a symbolic and practical extension of NATO’s deterrent posture.

But public opinion has lagged behind. The ambivalence toward military force in Germany is deeply rooted, tied not only to historical memory but to a political culture that prizes diplomatic engagement over armed confrontation. This was evident long before the current anxieties took hold: successive surveys over the last decade have shown a persistent reluctance among Germans to endorse offensive military action, even when faced with clear strategic threats from Moscow.

The Munich Security Conference report arrives at a moment when European capitals are wrestling with a host of strategic questions. NATO has responded to renewed Russian belligerence with enhanced positions along the alliance’s eastern border, including larger troop deployments and joint exercises with Baltic states. European Union legislators have even mooted the idea of a so-called “military Schengen” zone to expedite allied troop movements across the continent in a crisis.

At the same time, Berlin is navigating the practical implications of this new security landscape. Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has been among the most outspoken voices warning of escalating threats from Moscow, citing not only conventional military buildups but hybrid tactics including cyberattacks and violations of airspace. Indeed, recent reports suggest the Kremlin’s activities in European airspace and digital infrastructure have led German authorities to enhance defensive measures and coordination with NATO allies.

Yet for all this, the question of whether force should ever be used remains divisive. Germany finds itself in a strategic bind: it recognises the need for robust deterrence and collective defence, but a significant portion of its public is uneasy with the very notion of military engagement. This paradox mirrors broader debates in Europe about how to respond to an assertive Russia without tipping into direct confrontation. European leaders are urging greater defence cooperation and investment, but the contours of such cooperation remain contested.

For Germany, the path ahead is fraught with political and moral complexities. Its central location in Europe, substantial industrial base and demographic weight make it indispensable to NATO’s security architecture. Berlin has already taken steps to extend its commitments — from permanent troop deployments in Lithuania to championing a larger role for European partners within the alliance.

But whether Germans are ready to reconcile their historical scepticism with the stark realities of the present remains an open question. If the current survey is any indication, the public wants security — but not at the perceived cost of military engagement. That ambivalence could, in practice, constrain Berlin’s ability to lead on defence issues within NATO, even as the alliance seeks to present a united front against potential threats.

In the coming years, NATO will need not only capability and cohesion, but also a renewed narrative that reconciles public sentiment with strategic necessity. For Germany, this means forging a consensus that recognises both the imperatives of collective defence and the deeply held reservations of its people. The balance between deterrence and diplomacy, between fear and resolve, will shape not just Berlin’s policy, but the future of European security itself.

Main Image: By Müller / MSC https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/51st_Munich_Security_Conference#/media/File:MSC15_FRI_Mueller_VonDerLeyen_01.jpg

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